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Block Grants, Early Childhood Education,
and the Reauthorization of Head Start:
From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based
Agreement
Eloise Pasachoff*
In early 2003, the Bush administration proposed and Congress
considered two types of highly controversial structural reform to Head
Start, the federal program that since 1965 has provided early education
and comprehensive health and social services to low-income
preschoolers and their families.' First, the proposal would begin funding
Head Start through federal block grants to the states rather than through
direct federal grants to local agencies.2 Second, the proposal would shift
oversight of Head Start at the federal level from the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to the Department of Education
(ED).3 Variations on these two proposals have been offered many times
since Head Start was created, and each time Head Start advocates have
successfully lobbied against them.4 This time is no different: neither the
version of the reauthorization bill approved by the House in September
2005 nor the version of the bill currently awaiting consideration by the
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Katzmann, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, 2005-2006; Law Clerk to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2004-2005. J.D. Harvard Law
School, 2004; M.P.A. Kennedy School of Government, 2004; M.A. Yale University,

1998; A.B. Harvard College, 1995. The Hewlett Fellowship in Law and Negotiation
provided research support for this project. Many thanks to Martha Minow, Frank Sander,
Bob Bordone, and the many professionals in the fields of Head Start, early education, and
consensus building who took time away from their own work to be interviewed for this
project. The views here represented are my own, and the responsibility for any errors lies
with me.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., President Bush's
Plan to Prepare Children for Kindergarten (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030203.html
[hereinafter Press Release,
DHHS].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See infra Section I.
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Senate contains either of these structural reforms.5

That these proposed reforms are no longer under active
consideration has been held out as a victory by Head Start advocates, led
by the National Head Start Association (NHSA) and joined by a variety
of other advocacy organizations. This article questions that conclusion,
and instead argues that Head Start advocates would do well to reconsider
their long-held opposition to both changes. Much of the opposition to
these changes stems from reflexive reaction and a history of mistrust
instead of dispassionate policy analysis. The policy needs and doctrinal
context that led to the original structure of the program-for example,
the need to bypass racist state governors who were willing to close down
school systems to avoid integration, in an environment of almost
limitless federal authority to create civil rights legislation-are
increasingly out of place in today's world. In fact, Head Start is now an
outlier with respect to other social welfare and education programs,
which are largely funded by the federal government through block grants
to the states; educational authorities are now turning towards
comprehensive service delivery models that are the hallmark of Head
Start programs; and the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed the
atmospherics of limitless federal power in which context Head Start was
created.6
This article proceeds in four parts. Section I traces the history of the
conflict over proposals to change Head Start's funding and
organizational structure. I conclude that the dispute cannot easily be
reduced to partisan politics and that the substance of the opposition has
changed very little over the years, even though the particular proposals
for structural change have been quite different. Section II examines the
policy and doctrinal changes relevant to Head Start over the last forty
years, arguing that the needs and expectations of the 1965 program have
a very different resonance in the new millennium. Section III considers
why the advocates have been so resistant to structural change, given
these changed circumstances. The literature on negotiation theory and
practice offers a helpful lens through which to analyze the problem,
especially in the literature's distinction between positions-the particular
and opposing outcomes to which each side stakes a claim-and
interests-the underlying reasons why each side finds its desired
outcome appealing. I explore the benefits of paying attention to interests
over positions, the perils of focusing on narrow positions, and the
barriers to an interest-based process. Finally, Section IV proposes a way
forward, offering an inclusive and. participatory consensus-based process
5.
6.

See infra notes 86-95, 137-38 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.
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to help the parties consider and respond to the underlying interests
behind their positions. The article concludes that an honest assessment
of the role of Head Start in the country's early childhood education and
care movement could lead to structural experimentation that would
benefit all concerned.
To view the absence of the proposals for structural change in the
current versions of the reauthorization bill as a victory, or to view the
proposals themselves as no longer relevant, would be short-sighted.
History suggests both that the proposals will come around again and that
the battle over the proposals has repercussions for the rest of the debate
over reauthorization, and indeed for the success of Head Start itself. It is
therefore important to understand the most recent battle in its historical
context and to explore ways to change the dynamics of the debate.
Attention to the context of this conflict through the lens of negotiation
theory and practice has the potential to do more for Head Start and the
field of early childhood education and care in general than the
apocalyptic, limited terms of this current round of battles would suggest.
I.

Background to the Current Conflict: Disputes over Head Start's
Funding and Organizational Structure, 1965 to the Present

A.

Funding Structure: Federal-Localor Block Grantto the States?

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created the federal Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO), ushering in President Johnson's War
on Poverty, a series of federal initiatives designed to attack poverty at its
roots.7 Head Start opened in the summer of 1965 as one of these
initiatives, having moved from idea to implementation in little more than
six months.8 The federal government provided funding directly to the
local organizations that would run Head Start centers, bypassing state
and local government, largely because Head Start's founders believed
that these lower levels of government were impediments rather than aids
in solving the problems of poverty, especially where minorities were
concerned. 9 The founders were reluctant to let anti-poverty funding flow
through the hands of racist state officials who had closed or threatened to
7. See EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN MUENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT 2 (1992); Edward Zigler &
Karen Anderson, An Idea Whose Time Had Come: The Intellectualand Political Climate
for Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START: A LEGACY OF THE WAR ON POVERTY 3, 5
(Edward Zigler & Jeannette Valentine, eds., 1979).
8. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 7-55, for a description of this
planning period.
9. See, e.g., Carolyn Harmon & Edward J. Hanley, Administrative Aspects of the
Head Start Programin PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 379, 385.
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close public school systems rather than integrate them.' 0 Additionally,
the founders wanted to root Head Start directly in local communities to
underscore the importance of individual and community empowerment,
one of the missions of the War on Poverty. 1
The funding structure of the program has changed very little since
1965. There are currently ten regional offices of the federal agency that
runs Head Start, and grant applications and renewals go through the
regional office assigned to that applicant or grantee. 12 The federal
government provides eighty percent of the total funding for the program,
with a twenty percent match covered by the grantee.' 3 A grantee may
operate its own Head Start program directly, or it may entrust the
operation of a program to a delegate agency. 14 In the 2005 fiscal year,
the last year for which complete figures are available, Head Start served
just over 900,000 children in almost 50,000 classrooms
through 1,604
15
grantees, with a total budget of $6.8 billion dollars.
This funding structure stands in contrast to that of Community
Action Programs, another War on Poverty initiative, which are funded
through the Community Services Block Grant directly to the states,
which then disburse the funding to grantees themselves. 16 Much federal
funding for elementary and secondary education runs the same way,
through the state departments of education. 17 Federal funding for child
care programs, a much newer endeavor that dates only to 1990, similarly
moves through the Child Care and Development Block Grant to state
administrators. 18 Despite numerous efforts over the years to change the
funding structure of Head Start to parallel the block grant structure that is
10. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION
AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 31-35, 104-05, 270-72 (1998);
KENNETH J. MEIER, JOSEPH STEWART, JR., & ROBERT E. ENGLAND, RACE, CLASS, AND
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 46-47 (1989), for

more on the story of state governmental official response to school desegregation.
11. See Zigler & Anderson, supra note 7, at 6.
12. See, e.g., VALORA WASHINGTON & URA JEAN OYEMADE BAILEY, PROJECT HEAD
START: MODELS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 26-31 (1995).

13. Id. at 31.
14. See Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 380, for a useful chart.
15. See Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet (Mar. 2006), availableat
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/2006.htm. While the number of children
served has not quite doubled since the program opened in 1965 with half a million
children, funding has increased almost seventy-fold, from $96 million in 1965. See
WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 106-07, 115. This disproportionate increase of
funding as compared to children reveals that, in the debate over whether to serve more
children with fewer services or fewer children with more services, the latter view has
prevailed. See id.
16. See Community Services Block Grant, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9901, 9904 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Block Grant, 20 U.S.C. §§ 38013876 (2006).
18. See Child Care and Development Block Grant, 42 U.S.C. § 9801 (2006).
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common in other social service and education programs, the federal-local
structure of Head Start has remained unchanged from its 1965
conception. 1 9
A useful way of understanding these two types of funding structures
is to contrast what Harmon and Hanley call "the classical accountability
model" with "the recipient-participant model. 2 °
In the classical
accountability model, funding and policy direction flow from the federal
government to state and local governments through formulas linked to
state demographics; each layer of government is accountable to the one
above it.2 1 There is generally a uniform program design and a focus on
monitoring individual programs to make sure they comply with that
design.2 2 This model is expected to achieve accountability through
public officials who represent the entire citizenry. 3 This is the model
that matches the block grant structure. In contrast, in the recipientparticipant model, federal funding is directed to local organizations
outside the government.24 Policy and direction are shared between the
federal government and these local bodies, and funds are disbursed based
on the assessed needs of recipients rather than on strict demographic
formulas. Program recipients are connected to policymaking decisions,
and program variance rather than uniformity is expected.2 6
Accountability is achieved through monitoring compliance with local
needs and decisions, on the theory that recipient satisfaction indicates
acceptable use of government funds.27 It is an overstatement to identify
Head Start as a program purely in the recipient-participant vein, since the
federal government has directed policy and set requirements from the
start. 28 But more than the classical accountability model, the recipientparticipant model matches the funding structure of Head Start as
originally conceived.29
While the War on Poverty generally and Head Start in particular
were geared towards this latter model, the model had its detractors from
the start. 30 Efforts to change Head Start's funding structure to match the
classical accountability model began almost immediately. In 1968, a
19. See infra Section II.A for more on the growing predominance of block grants in
policy areas connected to Head Start.
20. Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 383-85.
21. Id. at 383.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 384.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 384.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 386.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 385.
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congressional effort to block grant Head Start almost succeeded when the
Senate passed an amendment that would have reallocated money
earmarked for Head Start to the states, requiring only that the money be
used to support early childhood programs. 3 ' When Richard Orton, the
federal administrator of Head Start, learned of a similar proposal about to
be introduced in the House, he triggered a national telephone campaign
to Congress with calls opposing the amendment.32 The amendment was
33
never introduced in the House, and the Senate proposal went nowhere.
In 1970, Nixon administration officials began floating the idea of
block granting Head Start as part of the President's New Federalism
initiative.34 Donald Rumsfeld, then the head of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (and from 2001 to 2006 President George W. Bush's
Secretary of Defense), prepared a memo for senior administration
officials arguing that federal grant programs were inefficiently run and
recommending that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) move
to decentralize such programs in the next budget cycle. 35 As a federal
grant program that dealt only with individual grantees rather than the
states, the federal-local structure of Head Start seemed in jeopardy, if not
all of Head Start itself. When Nixon's new administrator for Head Start,
Edward Zigler, had one of his first meetings with OMB representatives,
he was shocked to read a proposal for Head Start's future: "Phase out
one-third of Head Start the first year, one-third the second year, and
eliminate the entire program the third. 3 6 OMB's decentralization of
federal programs, likely to include Head Start, was thus linked to
dismantling Head Start entirely. Further, the timing of these proposals
coincided with the release of the first formal evaluation of Head Start,
which concluded that Head Start participation had no lasting cognitive
effect on children.37 The longstanding suspicion of Head Start advocates
31.

32.
33.
34.

See ZIGLER& MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 175.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81. See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN,

FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO
DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 19-92 (1998), for

more on President Nixon's New Federalism initiative.
35. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 81. OMB is the executive branch agency
that prepares the president's budget proposals and coordinates policy among the other
agencies.
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
organization/role.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
36. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 80.
37. Id. at 65-72; PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 391. See, e.g., Debate H."
Does Head Start Work?, in EDWARD ZIGLER & SALLY J. STYFCO, THE HEAD START
DEBATES 111-278 (2004); Part V. Evaluation of the Head Start Program, in PROJECT

HEAD START, supra note 7, at 399-507, for more on the evaluation of Head Start,
including critiques of the methodology used in this first evaluation and discussions of
later, more nuanced evaluations. See also WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 124135.
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that any proposal to decentralize Head Start is connected to ending it
because it does not work likely stems from this confluence of events.
This potential decentralization/phase-out of Head Start did not go
any further, in part due to three separate strategies to counter it. First,
Zigler embarked on a campaign to promote and publicize Head Start's
strengths and to attribute this positive view of Head Start to the
presidential administration itself.38 Second, Zigler worked on solving the
administrative problems that made Head Start vulnerable to accurate
criticism. 39 Finally, on-the-ground activism by Head Start parents, of
which Zigler was occasionally a target as part of the Nixon
administration, may have helped keep the program in place. Therefore,
Nixon's gesture towards decentralizing Head Start did not get far.
At the same time, however, a fight was brewing in Congress over
how to expand Head Start into a broader vision of national child care, a
battle in which Head Start's funding structure played a major role. The
proposed solution was the Comprehensive Child Development Act of
1971 .40 This Act, which stated explicitly that it was intended to lay the
groundwork for universal child care, would have created a national
network of federally funded child care centers, for which Head Start
would serve as the model; defined federal standards for the quality of
care; and provided federal funds to purchase child care facilities and to
train caregivers.4 1 Although both the House and Senate versions of the
bill were introduced by Democrats, the bills gained the cosponsorship of
a wide number of prominent Republicans and received wide bipartisan
support.42 The key difference between the House and Senate versions of
the bills, and the difference that ultimately spelled the Act's doom, was
the contrast between funding structures. 43 The Senate version would
have maintained the federal-local funding structure of the Head Start
model, thus retaining federal control, on the theory that this structure
would distribute the most money to the programs themselves. 4 A
coalition of Head Start, child care, and civil rights advocates emphasized
that they could support only a bill with this funding structure.4 5 In
contrast, the House version would have created a system of "prime
sponsorship," where states and cities with populations of over 500,000
could have been the direct recipients of federal money and could then

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 82-85.
Id. at 89-94; Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 392-94.
ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 123-24.
Id.
Id. at 124-28, 136.
Id. at 127-28, 137-38.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 138. 143.
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have disbursed funding locally, both to streamline administrative
oversight and because Republicans in the House had indicated that they
would be willing to go along with only this funding structure.46
The Nixon administration would have supported the House limit of
500,000, and it has been suggested that it might even have supported the
100,000 limit that was in place when the bill made it out of
subcommittee. 47 But a floor amendment to reduce the limit to a
population of 10,000 for prime sponsorship went too far, as did the
House and Senate conference committee's ultimate reduction of the
prime sponsorship population requirement to 5,000.48

While both the

Senate and the House passed the bill, bipartisan support had largely
evaporated, and President Nixon ultimately vetoed the bill with a ringing
condemnation of federal involvement in child care-condemnation that
he may not have actually felt but that seemed politically expedient, once
Republican support for the bill had disappeared. 49 That the question of
funding structure brought down this major piece of legislation that had
seemed like it would easily become law points to the salience of the
disagreement.
The Nixon administration's interest in block granting Head Start
was piqued again briefly in 1974, through contact made by Jimmy
Carter, then the governor of Georgia.
That year, pursuant to
congressional legislation, OMB published a circular that explained a new
opportunity for states to help coordinate their federally funded social
service programs, an opportunity that exemplified the decentralized
approach defining Nixon's New Federalism. 50 Carter wrote to OMB
requesting authority under this circular to control Georgia's Head Start
programs. 51
Internal maneuvering by Head Start's federal
administrators, who were advocates of the federal-local structure,
resulted in a swift rejection of this request.52 When Governor Carter
became President Carter, he made no further attempt to turn over control
of Head Start to the states.53
After President Reagan took office in 1980, his administration
began to discuss block granting Head Start.54 Proponents of block
granting-including,
this
time,
Head
Start's new
federal
administrators-felt that it was inefficient for the federal government to
46.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 137.

47. Id. at 141-43.
48.
49.

Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 146-47.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52.
53.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 176-77.
See id. at 178-84 (describing President Carter's efforts to restructure Head Start).

54.

Id. at 194.
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run so many local programs and that turning the program over to the
states might enable them to serve more children with no budget
increase. 55 Streamlining Head Start's thick book of program regulations
would also fit in with the President's move towards federal
deregulation.5 6 The President was expected to propose incorporating
Head Start's funding into the Community Services Block Grantalthough the earmarked funding for Head Start would be consequently
cut by $130 million.57 When some members of Congress who opposed
block granting learned about this proposal, however, they leaked it to the
press, who responded negatively,5 8 and the Reagan administration
eventually received over 5,000 letters opposing block grants.59
Responding to these pressures, the administration never made a formal
6°
proposal to Congress to revise Head Start's formal funding structure.
By the mid-1980s, Head Start had entered what would be a
relatively long period of structural stability, and the program enjoyed
strong bipartisan support.6 1
In 1988, both the Democratic and
Republican candidates for president campaigned on the issue of who
supported Head Start more strongly, and both parties proposed to extend
Head Start services to all eligible children.6 2 Congress's reauthorization
of Head Start in 1990 included a major boost in Head Start's budget.63
The program continued to expand under President Clinton with no sign
of anything but a commitment to maintaining Head Start as a federallocal program. 64 After the congressional election of 1994 turned control
over Congress to the Republicans, and devolving federal welfare
programs to the states emerged as an important item on the agenda, Head
Start was briefly on the list for consolidation with other low-income
social service programs into a block grant.65 However, the proposal to
include Head Start did not go very far.66 By the time President George

55. Id. Cf text at supra note 15.
56. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 106. See CONLAN, supra note 34, at
93-212, for an overview of President Reagan's plans for and implementation of federal
deregulation (which was also connected to cutting federal funds).
57. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 195.
58. Id. at 194-95.
59. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 106.
60. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 195-99.
61. See, e.g., Judith A. Chafel & Heather L. Sugioka, Head Start: A Decade of
Challenge and Change, in THE HEAD START DEBATES, supra note 37, at 309-13
(describing bipartisan efforts to increase funding for Head Start without proposals for
major structural change).
62. Id. at 210.
63. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 107-08.
64. See Chafel & Sugioka, supra note 61.
65. CONLAN, supranote 34, at 280.
66. Id.
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W. Bush took office in 2001, Head Start was serving just over 850,000
children with a budget of almost $5.3 billion, in the same federal-local
structure that it had since its inception.6 7 The latest iteration of the block
grant wars was about to emerge.
President Bush made clear from the early days of his presidential
campaign his interest in significantly changing the structure of Head
Start.68 When he finally released his proposal in February 2003 to turn
over control of Head Start to interested states and to move Head Start's
federal administration from HHS to the ED, no one was surprised. The
block grant element of President Bush's proposal would have allowed
any state to submit an application to the Secretaries of both HHS and ED
69
for state "coordinat[ion of] preschool programs including Head Start."
The applications would include
a plan outlining how [states] will: work with the public school
system to develop goals for all preschool programs in the state;
identify guidelines that preschool programs can use to achieve these
goals; devise an accountability system to determine whether children
are achieving the goals; provide professional development for
preschool teachers and administrators; and help parents provide
support for children to succeed in kindergarten. In addition, states
must describe how they will maintain the range of child development
goals of Head Start, including the provision7 of social, parental, and
health services in their Head Start programs. 0
The President's proposal offered two central rationales for turning
over control of Head Start to the states. First, state control would better
allow the state to integrate Head Start with its other programs serving
low-income children and families, especially child care and other
prekindergarten programs. This would promote efficiency and better
programmatic management and oversight. 7' Second, especially after
President Bush's education initiative No Child Left Behind (NCLB),
states should have the responsibility for the first step of education
because states are ultimately held responsible for the education of their
children.72
The day after the President's proposal was announced, the NHSA
issued its own press release opposing the plan, saying the changes would

67. Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
68. See Edward Zigler, Editorial, The Wrong Read on Head Start, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2000, at A19.
69. Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1.

70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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destroy the program.7 3 Although the Bush proposal itself never actually
used the term "block grant," the NHSA invoked the term as implicit in
state control. 74 Block granting, said the NHSA, would result in a
devastating loss of the comprehensive nature of the program. The NHSA
argued that state-run child care and prekindergarten programs do not
have the family-centered, whole-child approach that the Head Start
program does, so the unique nature of Head Start would be
compromised.75 The NHSA further argued that shifting this important
program to the states during a time of budget crises is not a wise move
because there would be too much temptation either to use too much
money in overhead or to serve too many children not as well.76 They
pointed to a recent study finding that federal dollars are eight times more
likely than state dollars to target disadvantaged children, exactly the
population served by Head Start.77 Further, they noted that Head Start
services provided to Indian tribes and to the families of seasonal and
migrant workers would be "in great jeopardy" under a structure that gave
control to the states. 78 Finally, the NHSA demonstrated a lack of trust of
the motives for block granting the program, saying that the real goal of
the block granting initiative was Head Start's ultimate destruction.7 9
As the House and Senate began discussions on Head Start's
reauthorization, the NHSA began an intensive lobbying campaign
opposing the President's proposals.80 One representative noted that his
office had never received as much feedback from his constituents as he
had on this bill. 81 The NHSA also sought the support of the press,
hoping to use widespread media coverage around the country to its
advantage. On July 25, 2003, in a dramatic late-night session, the House
of Representatives passed by one vote a much narrower version of the
administration's proposal; instead of block grants available to all fifty
states, the House version would create a pilot program limited to eight
73. NHSA, Legislative Alert: President Announces Plan to Move Head Start to
Department of Education, Says States Should Get Chance to Run Programs: NHSA Calls
For Immediate Action! (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.nhsa.org/members/advocacy/
legislative%5Falert/advocacy%5FIeg%5Falert%5F02042003.htm
[hereinafter NHSA,
Legislative Alert].
74.

Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73.
80. Id. See also ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 175; PROJECT HEAD START,
supra note 7, at 130.
81. School Readiness Act of 2003, H.R. 2210, 108th Cong. (2003). See Bill
Swindell & Kate Schuler, Scaled-Back Head Start Bill a Squeaker Win for GOP, CQ
WEEKLY, Jul. 26, 2003, at 1895.
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states.82
Advocates saw in this narrow House victory an opportunity to shut
down the proposal in the Senate, and several senators were quoted
immediately after the House vote saying they would reject any attempt to
block grant Head Start.83 By the time the Senate began to consider its
version of the reauthorization bill, even the House's proposed pilot
program of state control had disappeared. On October 29, 2003, the
Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee,
which oversees Head Start, voted unanimously across party lines for
draft legislation that rejected any attempt to block grant the program.84
The Senate version included instead a proposal to create 200 "centers of
excellence," which would help states coordinate their preschool services,
including Head Start. 85 While the NHSA eventually accepted the basic
concept of the centers of excellence, it continued to object to any
involvement of state governors in assessing which Head Start grantees
have merit. 86 On May 23, 2005, the Senate HELP Committee favorably
reported a bill that included the centers of excellence, and the bill was
placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on August 31, 2005.87
In the meantime, the House sponsor of the original bill with the
controversial pilot program provision expressed some willingness to drop
that aspect if necessary to move forward.88 Following through on that
suggestion, the House sponsor introduced a new bill on May 5, 2005,
excluding this proposal. 89 The House Committee on Education and the
Workforce favorably reported this bill on June 16, 2005, and the bill
passed the full House by a vote of 231 to 184 on September 22, 2005.90
82. See Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81, at 1895. The vote was delayed from a
previously scheduled July 18 vote because Republican leadership had known that many
of the bill's supporters would be absent on that day. Id. The July 25th vote was obtained
only after then-Majority Leader Tom DeLay sent for a House member who had been
injured several days before in a car accident and was on bedrest, and it was after midnight
when the final vote was cast. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Bill Swindell, Party Differences Over Head Start Belie Unanimous Vote in
Senate Committee, CQ WEEKLY, Nov. 1, 2003, at 2706.
85. Id.
86. NHSA, Position Paper: Our View of the U.S. Senate Head Start Reauthorization
Bill, S. 1940, Apr. 7, 2004, at 3-4, available at http://www.nhsa.org/research/
research re res articles.htm.
87. See S. REP. No. 109-131, at 4, 37-38 (2005); see also Head Start Improvements
for School Readiness Act, S. 1107, 109th Cong. (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last
accessed Oct. 23, 2006), to search for the bill's status.
88. See Swindell, supra note 84, at 2706.
89. Bill Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary; Head Start Reauthorization, CQ
WEEKLY, Jan. 2, 2006, at 33 [hereinafter Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary]; see also
School Readiness Act of 2005, H.R. 2123, 109th Cong. (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/
(last accessed Oct. 23, 2006), to search for the bill's status.
90. See H.R. 2123, 109th Cong. (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last accessed Oct.
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With House insistence on the pilot program gone, reconciliation between
the House and Senate versions of the bill seems more likely, and a
reauthorized
Head Start may, after three years of debate, finally be on the
91
horizon.
With the story of the block grant wars thus brought up to date, it is
important to note the effect that history had on the NHSA's response to
President Bush's proposal, which differed from previous attempts to
block grant Head Start in several key respects. First, while the 1968
proposal to block grant Head Start would have folded the program's
funding into a general grant to the states with no specifics beyond 9a2
requirement that the money be used for early childhood education,
President Bush's proposal would have required states to submit for
approval detailed plans of how they would spend the money. 93 The
proposal would additionally have required that the state plans provide "at
a minimum, the same coverage to serve at least as many Head Start
eligible" children as under the current system, "including social, family,
and health services," a requirement that differs from previous attempts to
water down the program. 94 Further, in contrast to the Reagan proposal,
which was linked both to budget cuts and the ultimate deregulation of the
program, 95 the Bush proposal and its House counterpart required states to
match their federal funds by at least fifty percent, with no mention of
budget cuts, and to "generally meet or exceed" current federal
standards.96 This proposal thus had certain safeguards that were lacking
in previous proposals. It is certainly possible that the proposals for state
control would weaken Head Start's mandate, but the response of the
advocates relied on old arguments that had worked to shut down block
grants before without differentiating this proposal from earlier attempts.
While neither side mentioned the history of the block grant wars, it is
easy to see how advocates traced the roots of this proposal to earlier
versions and saw danger ahead.
Yet it is also possible to see how advocates may have overstated the
issue. As later parts of this article demonstrate, it is possible to imagine
more state involvement in Head Start programs in ways that support
rather than undercut the program's objectives. In particular, as some
impartial policy analysts observed at the time, a narrow, short-term pilot
23, 2006), to search for the bill's status.
91. See Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary, supra note 89. While other differences
between the House and Senate bills still require resolution, the absence of the block grant
proposal in the House version removes a crucial stumbling block. See id.
92. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 175.
93. See Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1.
94. Id.
95.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 194-95.

96.

Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1; Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81 at 1895.
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program for more state control, such as that proposed in the first House
bill, could have been a relatively low-risk way to explore whether
different structures could benefit program participants.97
Before
examining this possibility further, I turn to the second major structural
change proposed by the Bush administration: moving federal oversight
of the program from the Department of Health and Human Services to
the Department of Education.
B.

OrganizationalStructure: Department of Health and Human
Services or Department of Education?

Since neither HHS nor ED existed in its current form when Head
Start was created, the formal aspect of this debate is relatively new.
However, the central dispute that lies behind it-whether Head Start
should be a narrowly tailored education program or a broad-based
comprehensive social service program-has a long history.
Head Start originated in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
as the brainchild of that office's director, Sargent Shriver, and the team
of professionals he pulled together to create the program. 98 Shriver and
his team designed Head Start as a comprehensive program, providing
much more than a preschool program to ease poor children's transition to
school. 99 The fourteen-person planning committee put in place in
December 1964 contained only two early childhood educators among its
physicians, clinical and research psychologists, and academics and
university administrators in the fields of nursing, social work, and
education.100
Only one of the committee's original seven
recommendations for Head Start focused on developing academic skills;
the other six focused on physical and mental health, emotional and social
development, and parent and family involvement and integration. 10 1 The
committee purposely avoided defining Head Start as an educational

97. See Ron Haskins & Isabel Sawhill, The Future of Head Start, Policy Brief No.
27 (Brookings Inst. 2003) (recommending that Congress create a five-state pilot

program).
98. PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 36, 114-16; see also ScoTT STOSSEL,
SARGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SARGENT SHRIVER 417-21 (2004).
99. See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 73. See II: The Preschool-Education
Component of Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 153-228; III: Head
Start as a Comprehensive Developmental Program, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note
7, at 229-336, for more on the educational components and comprehensive components
of Head Start.
100. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 at 8, 18, 42. See PROJECT HEAD START,
supra note 7, at 72-114, for individual reminiscences from the members of this planning
committee.
101. PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 137; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7,

at 18-19.
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program and linking Head Start to the school system, which they saw as
enforcing racial segregation and traditional patterns of economic power,
as well as lacking in the comprehensive effort they believed to be key to
conquering poverty. 10 2 The committee called for Head Start to remain in
the OEO only until it demonstrated its effectiveness,
at which time it
10 3
should be moved to a cabinet-level department.
While the planning committee had focused on developing Head
Start as a comprehensive program, Head Start ended up being publicized
as a program designed primarily to bolster poor children's IQs, in part
because this was easy for the public and politicians to understand and
support.'0 4 This initial focus on IQ scores likely contributed to early
congressional attempts to transfer Head Start to the Office of Education,
10 5
over the strenuous objections of Head Start's federal administrators.
An early version of this congressional effort took place in 1967, though
the sponsoring senator stressed the problems with Head Start's current
fiscal management rather than any benefit that would come from running
the program through the school systems. 106 That attempt, like most that
would follow, never made it out of committee, and Head Start remained
in the OEO.' °7
Shortly after President Nixon took office, he announced his
intention to move Head Start to the Department of Health, Education,
10 8
and Welfare (HEW), the predecessor agency of both HHS and ED.
Some took this proposal as a sign of President Nixon's approval of the
program, since only successful programs were supposed to move out of
the OEO, and since Nixon had expressed distaste for many OEO
programs. 10 9 The administration created a new agency in HEW, the
Office of Child Development (OCD), in which Head Start was placed. 10
102. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 174. This interest in distancing Head
Start from the public school system was not unanimous among Head Start's founders;
Shriver, who had been the head of the Chicago school board for five years, hoped that
Head Start would bring poor, minority parents into the school system. Id. See also
PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 57; Stossel, supra note 98, at 420, for Shriver's
reminiscences.
103. See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 381.
104. See, e.g., ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 26.
105.

See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 130.

106. See ZIGLER &
note 7, at 130.
107.

MUENCHOW,

supra note 7, at 175; PROJECT HEAD

START,

supra

See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 175; PROJECT HEAD START, supra

note 7, at 130.
108. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 26; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note
7, at 74-75.
109. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 26; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note
7, at 74-75.
110. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 74; WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note
12, at 27.
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The director of OCD joined the commissioner of education and
commissioner of social and rehabilitative services in reporting directly to
the HEW secretary, a much higher status for Head Start than if Head
The
Start's director had been folded into the Office of Education.'
placement of Head Start in OCD rather than the Office of Education also
acknowledged the program's comprehensive focus.
When President Carter took office in 1977, he gave OCD a new
name: the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF)." 2
This name change was not the only change on the horizon for Head Start
in the Carter administration. President Carter had campaigned on the
promise of creating a separate cabinet-level Department of Education13
and had been elected with strong support from the education lobby.
When President Carter began considering which programs from HEW he
would propose to move to the new ED, Head Start was originally on the
list. 114 OMB proposed, in fact, that almost all social welfare programs
with any educational component should move to a new Department of
Education and Human Development, which would link education with
comprehensive services, including job training, delinquency prevention,
and Head Start."l5 HEW's jurisdiction would remain limited to Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, Medicare and Medicaid, and Social
Security.1 6 However, OMB cautioned that Head Start should be moved
only if other human development programs joined it in the ED; otherwise
Head Start would run the risk of becoming a narrowly focused education
program itself.1 17 The original vision for the new Education Department,
then, was to use a wide variety of programs to transform education into a
broad-based community endeavor, with Head Start as a model. President
Carter 18accepted this OMB vision and approved the transfer of Head
Start.'
Despite strong congressional support for the new department, 119 a
major political stumbling block for the ED turned out to be the inclusion
of Head Start on its list of proposed programs. Recalling the original
reasons why Head Start had not been linked to the school system in
111.
112.
113.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 86.
WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 27.
ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 178.

114. Id. at 179-84.
115. Id. at 179.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 183 (noting that President "Carter's first elected position had been to a
school board. He did not see anything wrong with elected officials administering Head
Start programs.").
119. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 183. See also D.T. STALLINGS, CTR. FOR
CHILD AND FAMILY POLICY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

1979-2002 at 5 (Duke Univ. 2002).
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1965-the school system's perceived racism, inattention to traditionally
under-served children, and reluctance to provide comprehensive and
family services-advocates such as the Children's Defense Fund
threatened to campaign against the department on civil rights grounds, a
response that would have been politically devastating for the
legislation. 12 In response to claims that Head Start would serve as a
model for a revitalized and broad-based education system, advocates
asked rhetorically how tiny little Head Start could transform the entire
education system.12 ' The NHSA and parents lobbied legislators and staff
against moving Head Start to the new department, emphasizing the
school system's inability to deal adequately with the poor and minority
children served by Head Start.122 The advocates prevailed, and in the
final bill, the ED contained almost none of the human development
programs that had originally been slated for it. 123 The current debate

about whether moving Head Start to the ED will result in the loss of its
comprehensive focus is thus directly related to the Head Start advocates'
1977 campaign to keep the ED from being a comprehensive agency; had
the ED been created with the broad-based mandate that President Carter
intended, Head Start would seem a natural program to unfold under its
auspices.
No attempt was made to move Head Start to the ED under the next
three presidential administrations, but the proposal was part of the
current President Bush's original reform plan. 124 It is true that the press
release that announced President Bush's proposal for restructuring Head
Start never explicitly mentioned completely moving oversight of Head
Start from HHS to ED; in fact, the only mention of ED is in the shared
administration of state applications between the secretaries of HHS and
ED, which at least on its face suggests that some part of the program's
administration would remain with HHS.125 However, the move to the
120.

ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 173-74, 183-85. Civil rights leaders such

as Coretta Scott King, Vernon Jordan, Joseph Lowery, and Jesse Jackson also advocated
that Head Start be left out of the new ED, comparing this fight to the battle against
segregation. See id. at 181.
121.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ACYF, HEAD START IN THE 1980's:

REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (1980) (quoting Marian Wright Edelman as saying
that it is foolish to assume "that a $735 million program will create the bureaucratic
leverage to reform a $17 billion department supporting a $90 billion public school
system").
122. ZIGLER&MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 185-86.
123. Id. at 186.
124. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (describing President Reagan's
sole proposal for structural change of Head Start and indicating that the mid-1980s
through 2000 were years of structural stability for the program); see also Press Release,
DHHS, supra note 1.
125. Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1.
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ED was widely acknowledged to be part of President Bush's mission,
and administration officials linked state success in early education
programs like Head Start to the President's education initiative,
NCLB. 126 Officials also emphasized the President's interest in strongly
emphasizing literacy skills in Head Start programs, proposing that Head
Start children face a standardized
test to assess the quality of the program
27
in teaching these skills. 1

The Head Start community responded to this element of the
President's proposal negatively: "President Announces Plan to Move
Head Start to Department of Education... . NHSA calls for Immediate
Action!' ' 128 The NHSA voiced its displeasure with the transfer to the ED
in now-familiar terms:
School programs have never focused on
comprehensive services the way that Head Start has, and moving Head
29
Start to the ED would be devastating for this element of the program.
While over thirty states have preschool programs, the NHSA said, "only
six required on site case workers to be available, and half did not provide
regular vision, health, and mental health screenings."' 30 The NHSA also
pointed out that the school system does not involve parents in the same
way Head Start does, and expressed skepticism that it ever could.' 3'
When the House took up consideration of the President's proposal
in the spring of 2003, intense lobbying against the idea of transferring
Head Start to the ED led it to be dropped from the bill on which the
House actually voted in July 2003.32 The Senate bill never even
included this element of the proposal. 133 Why was this proposal so easily
dropped from consideration while the transfer to the states had more
traction? There is no obvious constituency that supports transferring
Head Start to the ED. Education advocacy organizations that might have
stepped behind it have bigger concerns on their horizon, including
compliance with NCLB, and may not want to expend financial and
political capital on a matter that does not centrally concern them. Further,
the fact that some school systems are already running Head Start
126. See Valerie Strauss & Amy Goldstein, Head Start Changeover Proposed;More
State Control, Literacy Focus Cited, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at Al; Jill S. Gross,
ChangingHead Start: Some Say Revamping PreschoolProgram Could Threaten Mix of
Teaching, Services, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2003, at Cl.
127. See David Pierson, Testing Expands to Kids in Head Start, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2003, at 16; Valerie Strauss, Head Start Teachers Resist New Training; Sessions on
Literacy Pushed by Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A3.

128.
129.
130.
131.

NHSA, Legislative Alert, supranote 73.
See id.
Id.
Id.; see also Meredith May, Overhaul of Head Start worries some children's

advocates, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 27, 2003, at A3.

132.
133.

Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81.
Swindell, supra note 84.
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programs indicates that the education community does not need the
transfer of Head Start to the ED to become involved. In contrast, the
transfer of Head Start from federal government control to the states fits
with a broader ideological preference for state control, a preference with
a large constituency.
Because the Senate proposal for state centers of excellence remains
a viable legislative possibility, 134 the proposed transfer of Head Start to
the ED has, even more than some added form of state involvement, died
in this round of reauthorization. Still, from a policy perspectiveconsidering without prejudice the value of linking Head Start to schools
incorporating comprehensive services into educational programs-it is
not at all clear that keeping Head Start completely separate from the ED
is best.
C. Party-LinePolitics and the Current Context
It is tempting to reduce the block grant debates to partisan politics.
According to this view, the Head Start block grant wars rehearse a
familiar dispute between the Democrats, who support Head Start's origin
in the War on Poverty, and the Republicans, who think the federal
government should get out of the business of running social service
programs. 135 Indeed, there are some aspects to this charge that are
realistic. For example, in the long-standing dispute over whether Head
Start actually works, it is more often Republicans rather than Democrats
who express doubt or suggest eliminating the program entirely.1 36 There
is no love lost between the Head Start community and Republican Vice
President Dick Cheney, who voted to cut Head Start when he was a
legislator in the 1980s, 137 or Donald Rumsfeld, who was behind Nixon
proposals to restructure and/or eliminate Head Start. 138
More
specifically, the reauthorization bill that passed the House in July 2003
39
was generally split along party lines, with no Democrats voting for it.'
134.
135.

See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Bush Budget Would Overhaul Great Society, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003, at Al; Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, Republicans
Dismantle Head Start, Undermining Aspirations of Working Parents, available at
http://www.democraticleader.house.gov/issues/education/head-start.cfn.
136. See, e.g., WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 14, 35, 125-35; PROJECT
HEAD START, supra note 7, at 399-514; Darcy Ann Olsen, It's Time to Stop Head Start,
HUMAN EvENTs, Sept. 1, 2000, http://www.cato.org/research/education/articles/
stopheadstart.html (last accessed Aug. 20, 2006); Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81, at
1895.
137. Jim Provance, Cheney Goes on Defensive Over Old Head Start Vote,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 2000, at A- 13.
138. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 81.
139. Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81, at 1895.
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However, such a view is neither entirely accurate nor ultimately
helpful. For example, President Bush did not have unanimous support
from conservative legislators for restructuring Head Start. 140 In contrast,
the Senate committee voted unanimously across party lines in support of
its bill in November 2003.141 Moreover, Head Start has long enjoyed
142
wide bipartisan support from presidents and legislators alike.
Proposals to restructure Head Start have always come from both parties,
from Republican President Nixon's attempt to block grant Head Start to
Democratic President Carter's attempt to move it to the ED. Moving
beyond Head Start to other controversies around federal as opposed to
state control, it was the first President Bush, a Republican, who signed
into law the Child Care and Development Block Grant of 1990, the first
major federal initiative for child care since the failed Comprehensive
Child Development Act of 1971-a law that firmly linked the federal
government to supporting early care and education. 143 It was Democratic
President Clinton who signed into law one of the most controversial
block grant moves of the last two decades-the end of the federal
welfare entitlement program in favor of time-limited block grants to the
states. 14 4 And while the current President Bush's NCLB is structured as
a block grant, it represents a major increase in federal involvement in
education, something quite different from what, for example, President
Reagan would have thought appropriate.1 45 NCLB itself crosses party
lines both in support and disdain; it was passed with the strong support of
congressional Democrats, and yet now faces strong criticism for its
alleged underfunding and overly stringent requirements from state
146
governors and legislators of both parties.
Finally, the idea that the federal government support is linked firmly
and inextricably to progressive policies while state support is linked to
conservative policies may be rooted more in historical happenstance-it

140. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73.
141. See Swindell, supra note 84.
142. See, e.g., Sarah Glazer, Head Start: Does the much-touted program really
deliver? CQ RESEARCHER, Apr. 9, 1993, at 1. See also ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note
7, at 121-22, 210-11.
143. See CONLAN, supra note 34, at 222-23.
144. See id. at 290-91.
145. Contrast, for example, the detailed requirements of NCLB, to which the ED has

devoted an entire website, www.ed.gov/nclb, with President Reagan's stated desire to
disestablish that Department. See STALLINGS, supra note 119, at 4.
146. See, e.g., Ronnie Lynn, 'No Child' rebellion picking up momentum, THE SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 2004, at Al; Eric Kelderman, State republicans assail Bush
education law, STATELINE.ORG, Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://www.stateline.org/
live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld= 136&languageId= 1&contentld = 15546;
Betsy
Hammond, Oregon considers challenging No Child Left Behind law, THE OREGONIAN,
Nov. 26, 2003, at Al.

BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

2006]

was FDR's federal New Deal that overcame the Depression, while the
argument for states' rights has sometimes been linked to white
supremacy-than anything required by the structure of federalism itself.
If the federal government provides a floor beneath which states may not
descend, there is no reason to assume that states will always provide
fewer resources than the federal government would.
Reducing the disputes over the structure of Head Start to party-line
politics therefore ultimately obscures real policy questions and makes
unbiased reconsideration of program structure difficult. It is important to
recognize the long, contentious history of these disputes. But it is also
important to consider whether substantive arguments from 1965 or 1975
still hold sway. The Head Start advocates seem to have won their current
battles against structural reform, but will the victory be anything but
pyrrhic? Further, how does this decades-long history affect political
relationships crucial to improving the program in ways the advocates
want? The next two sections attempt to answer these questions, first by
exploring policy and doctrinal changes that have reshaped the field in the
decades since Head Start was created, and next by exploring procedural
barriers to policy change.
II.

A.

Policy Changes and Doctrinal Developments Relevant to Head
Start, 1965 to the Present
Policy Changes
1.

Early Childhood Education and Care

When Head Start was created in 1965, preschool and formal child
care programs for children five years old and under were rare. Labor
force participation of women with children was low; in 1960, only onefifth of mothers with children under the age of six worked outside the
home. 147 Additionally, matching the one-worker, two-parent family
structure that was then typical, the government expected mothers
receiving welfare to stay at home caring for their children; welfare
reform was only just beginning to connect welfare recipients to work
outside the home. 14 8 Child development research was just starting to
focus on the important role that environmental factors in the first few
147. Sheila B. Kamerman & Shirley Gatenio, Overview of the Current Policy
Context, in EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION & CARE IN THE USA 7 (Debby Cryer &
Richard M. Clifford, eds., 2003). See also WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., EVERYBODY'S
CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A PUBLIC PROBLEM 16-19 (Brookings Inst. 1995).
148. ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, CHILD CARE: FACING THE HARD
CHOICES 122-25 (Auburn House 1987).
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years of a child's life would play in that child's future academic and
social development. 149 What few preschool programs there were
150
generally served as enrichment programs for the middle class.
Previous federal attention to child care issues had arisen only in the
context of wartime, as federally-sponsored day care centers allowed
women to work outside the home when the male labor force was off in
battle; the last federal initiative for child care, the Lanham Act, had
expired at the end of World War II.151 States had never developed any
formal child care programs, although states had eventually assimilated
kindergartens, which had started as private charity-based organizations,
into the public schools. 15 In this context, Head Start stood out as an
innovative program, unique in its field.
Today, that field has changed. 153 By 1996, over sixty percent of
mothers with children under six worked outside the home, 5 4 making the
need for formal child care common. The controversial 1996 change in
the welfare laws now requires that even women with infants work
outside the home to receive benefits, again increasing the need for child
care. 155 Single-parent families have also increased, and heads of these
households are likely to work full time and need child care. 5 6 Private
day care centers have exploded in number. 157 A 1999 study reported that
forty-six percent of three-year-olds and seventy percent of four-year-olds
received some type of center-based care that year. 158 Infants and toddlers
are also increasingly served by child care; in 1995, fifty-four percent of
two-year-olds, fifty percent of one-year-olds, and forty-five percent of
children under one were served by some type of nonparental child care
arrangement, primarily through nonrelative care outside the child's

149.

Zigler & Anderson, supra note 7, at 6-11.

150.

Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 5.

151.

Id.;

ABBIE GORDON KLEIN, THE DEBATE OVER CHILD CARE, 1969-1990: A
SOCIOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS 59-60 at n. 1 (1992).
152. See KLEIN, supra note 151, at 261-320 (discussing the history of controversies

surrounding kindergarten and their parallel to contemporary controversies surrounding
child care).
153. See generally GERALDINE YOUCHA, MINDING THE CHILDREN: CHILD CARE IN
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1995), for more on the history of these
developments; see also KLEIN, supra note 151; JAMES L. HYMES, JR., EARLY CHILDHOOD
EDUCATION: TWENTY YEARS IN REVIEW (1991); KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 148.
154. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 7-8.
155. Id. at 8-9. See infra Section II.A.2 for more on the 1996 welfare reauthorization.
156. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 7-8.
157. GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 44, 68 (1995); KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note
148, at 108.
158. Anne W. Mitchell, Educationfor All Young Children: The Role of States and the
Federal Government in Promoting Prekindergarten and Kindergarten 4 (Found. for
Child Dev. Working Paper Series 2001).
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home. 159 Child development research on the importance of the birth to
five years has had a ripple effect through American society, leading to
the growth of an entire industry to support young children's early
development, Child care and development are thus increasingly seen as
a broad-based societal need and a common reality, not only of poor
families but of all families,160and developmentally appropriate activities
are expected of quality care.
Oxer time, families have come to rely on both federal and state
involvement in the provision or regulation of these services. At the
federal level, a wide variety of programs exist, none of which were in
place when Head Start was created. Most centrally, the Child Care and
Development Fund (CCDF), overseen by the Child Care Bureau in
HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF), provides states
with a block grant to subsidize child care for parents whose income is
less than eighty-five percent of the state's median income. 161 In fiscal
year 2006, CCDF-including mandatory, matching, and discretionary
funds-was funded at $4.9 billion.' 62 ACF, along with state welfare
agencies, also administers Temporary Assistance for Needy Family
(TANF), which is the block grant that replaced the federal provision of
welfare and which is another major source of federal funding for child
care. 163 Estimates for state child care expenditures through TANF were
at $2.2 billion in 2001.164 The Social Services Block Grant is a smaller
source of federal child care money that ACF administers, providing $165
million for child care in 2000.165
Outside HHS, the Child and Adult Care Food Program, run by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service, provides
funding for state agencies to subsidize meals and snacks in licensed child
care programs, worth $1.74 billion in fiscal year 2001.166 Additionally,
the ED administers grants to state education agencies to provide early
intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities, over $400
159.
160.
161.

Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 17, tbl. 1.4.
See, e.g., GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 25-32.
Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 18. See Julienne C. Johnson, The Role

of Government in Early Care and Education: Who Decides? in CONTINUING ISSUES IN

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 10-11, 18-22 (Carol Seefeldt & Alice Galper, eds., 2d ed.
1998), for more on the history of CCDF. See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A
FRAGILE FOUNDATION: STATE CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE POLICIES viii-ix, 2-3 (2001).

162. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations,
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccb/policyl/misc/approp02.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).
163. W.S. Barnett & L. Masse, Funding Issues for Early Childhood Education and
CarePrograms,in EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, supra note 147, at 146-47.

164.
165.
166.

Id. at 147.
Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 21.
Id.
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million in fiscal year 2006, and special education and related services for
preschool-aged children with disabilities, over $381 million in fiscal year
2006.167 The ED also supports preschool programs through its state
funding for high-poverty school districts, amounting to approximately
$200 million in 2002, and coordinates a variety of smaller competitive
grant programs for preschool-aged children. 168 Finally, the Child and
Dependent Care Tax Credit, overseen by the Department of Treasury's
Internal Revenue Service, allows a family's personal income tax to be
reduced on a sliding scale by a certain percentage of eligible expenses
towards child care. 16 9
In 2000, the tax credit was valued at
approximately $3 billion and was used by more than six million
families. 70
Four structural points from this review of federal programs are
relevant for our purposes. First, Head Start is no longer unique in
providing federal resources for preschool-aged children and their
families. It is true that Head Start is the only program that serves exactly
the population that it does in exactly the way that it does, but this fact
does not necessarily lead to the idea that its structure is the only possible
way to achieve its aims. Second, all of the major programs that are not
tax relief are funded as block grants to the states, whether through human
service agencies or education agencies. The block grants contain clearly
specified program requirements, with the federal government permitting
the states to use federal funds only within strict guidelines. 71 Any
requirement that could be enforced by a federal-local structure could thus
also be written into the structure of a block grant. Third, Indian tribes
and U.S. territories are not left out of the block grant structure to the
states, a fear that the NHSA voiced if Head Start were turned over to the

167. Id. at 21-22; Barnett & Masse, supra note 163, at 149-50; Child Care Bureau,
Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra note 162.
168. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra
note 162; see also Danielle Ewen, Jennifer Mezey, & Hannah Matthews, Ctr. for Law &
Social Policy, Missed Opportunities? The Possibilitiesand Challengesof FundingHigh-

Quality Preschoolthrough Title I of the No Child Left Behind Act (Mar. 2005).
169. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 20; Johnson, supra note 161, at 10.
170. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 20. Another tax relief program that
supports private spending on child care is the Dependent Care Assistance Program, which
allows eligible taxpayers to deduct a certain amount of their child care expenses from
their taxable income. Employers must elect to provide this type of account to their
employees. See Barnett & Masse, supra note 163, at 148; NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR.,
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: USING TAX BREAKS TO HELP PAY FOR CHILD AND

DEPENDENT CARE 5 (2002).

171. The Child Care block grant, in particular, is detailed in its requirements. See
GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 122-23. It is true, however, that federal policy has been to
allow the states a wide degree of flexibility in setting program aims. See Kamerman &
Gatenio, supra note 147, at 24.

2006]

BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

states. 172 For example, the Child Care and Development Fund provides
money directly to tribes. 173 Finally, the ED is already involved with
federal child care moneys. Although HHS's Child Care Bureau clearly
plays a larger role, the alleged great divide between ED and HHS may
not be so great.
The states themselves have devoted growing amounts of funds to
early care and education services since Head Start was founded, and
especially since the passage of the 1990 federal Child Care and
Development Block Grant. 174 All fifty states now offer some form of
kindergarten, generally serving five- and six-year-olds, and attendance is
increasingly mandatory. 175 Since 1991, states have almost tripled their
financial funding for prekindergarten programs, reaching almost $1.9
billion in 2000, and forty-two states now run some type of
prekindergarten program. 7 6 Since federal child care money requires that
states use it to "supplement, not supplant" already available state
dollars, 177 the overall amount of money for child care has increased over
the period that these federal funds have been offered. 7 8 Further, more
federal money becomes available as states increase the use of state funds,
and although not all states can budget enough child care dollars to obtain
the federal maximum, some do. 179 Interestingly, seventeen states use
their own funds to expand Head Start programs; three other states use the
federal Head Start program standards in their own non-Head Start
programs. 18 While none of these state services are available to every
eligible child-whether funded at the federal or state level, all early care
and education, including Head Start, is underfunded, and threatened in
times of cutting budgetsl1l-the growth in state provision of services,
172.

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

173. See, e.g., Child Care Bureau, Reporting Requirements for Child Care and
Development
Fund
(CCDF)
Grantees,
http://www.ac f.hhs.gov/programs/ccb/
report/index.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2006) (listing resources and requirements for tribal
grantees).

174.

See Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 22-24; Barnett & Masse, supra

note 163, at 151-53; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION, supra note
161; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, STATE DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD CARE, EARLY
EDUCATION, AND SCHOOL-AGE CARE 2001; Mitchell, supra note 158, for more on the
development of state attention to early care and education.
175.
EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, STATE NOTES KINDERGARTEN: STATE
STATUTES REGARDING KINDERGARTEN (Aug. 2003).

176. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 23.
177. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra
note 162.
178. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 24.
179. Johnson, supra note 161, at 12.
180.

Mitchell, supra note 158, at 15, App. 1 2-5.

181.
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, LOW-INCOME FAMILIES BEAR THE BURDEN OF STATE
CHILD CARE CUTBACKS (2002); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION,
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vouchers or subsidies to parents, and reimbursement to child care
providers has significantly changed the shape of the field in the last
decade.
Federal Head Start policy has grown to accommodate the explosion
of the field of early childhood education and care. Since 1990, the
federal Head Start Bureau has funded Head Start-State Collaboration
Offices to promote coordination of state programs that serve this age
group. 182 The collaboration office in each state is located in a different

office, including a special state executive branch office for children, a
state department of education, a state department of social services, and a
governor's office. 83 The existence of these collaboration offices cuts
both ways in the argument over whether federal-local or state control is
better. On the one hand, the fact that the offices exist might suggest that
states need greater control over funding and policy to better coordinate
their efforts, while on the other hand, the fact that the offices exist might
suggest that no more state control or coordination than what is already in
place is needed. Either way, though, the rhetoric about the states being
unable to run effective programs for needy children is belied. Further,
that the collaboration offices are located in so many different
administrative agencies also cuts both ways in the argument over
whether HHS or ED must run Head Start: on the one hand, it might
suggest that the particular agency that governs these services is less
important than the services that are being coordinated and provided,
while on the other hand, it might suggest that the state agency is
unimportant only if the federal agency is providing oversight to the
issues in a way that only HHS can. Either way, the different types of
state agencies underscore the high extent to which the issues that concern
Head Start are strongly embedded throughout state policy.
Beyond the existing programs at the federal and state level, a vast
network of think-tanks, university research programs, and advocacy
organizations have spearheaded a national debate about the potentials for
a full-scale provision of early education and care.1 84 Many researchers
and advocates have developed proposals for providing quality early
supra note 161, at viii.
182. See Head Start Bureau, The Head Start-State Collaboration Offices (2006),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/contacts/statecollabl.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).
183. See Head Start Bureau, Head Start-State Collaboration Offices (2003),
http://www.acfhhs.gov/programs/hsb/contacts/statecollab.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).

184.

See The Nat'l Ctr. for Children in Poverty (Columbia Univ. Mailman School of

Public Health), available at http://www.nccp.org/; The Children's Defense Fund,
available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/; The Nat'l Child Care Info. Ctr., available
at www.nccic.org, for a sampling of different types of organizations.
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education and care to every child in the country, noting that the current
approach is too fragmented.'85 Some of these proposals advocate linking
Head Start with other programs for a seamless delivery system. 186 No
one suggests that the current patchwork of programs provides enough
quality education and care to enough children and families. In part, the
problem is related to underfunding; despite the array of federal and state
programs designed to provide financial support for child care, families
still pay around seventy percent of the country's total child care
expenses,' 87 which for low-income families can be twenty-five percent or
more of their budgets, 88 and which also is a high fixed cost even for
middle class families. 89 Even Head Start, which is free for those
enrolled, is funded at a level that reaches only around one-third of all
children who are otherwise eligible for it.' 90 In part, the problem is
related to quality; Head Start remains one of the few widespread
programs with strict standards for quality and accountability, and many
programs are not as well crafted.' 9' Still, the explosion of attention to the
field completely changes the context in which Head Start finds itself,
making a reexamination of its structure appropriate.
2.

Health, Welfare, and Work

An important aspect of Head Start is the program's role in providing
health services for the children under its care. 92 This health component
of Head Start is one that advocates fear will disappear if the program

185. See, e.g., Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 6;
at 166-91; DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN

231 (2001); Gwen Morgan, A Head Startfor All Children, in

GORMLEY, supra note 147,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 216THE HEAD START DEBATES,

supra note 37, at 363-77.
186. See, e.g., MATIA

FINN-STEVENSON & EDWARD ZIGLER, SCHOOLS OF THE 21ST
CENTURY: LINKING CHILD CARE AND EDUCATION 113-16 (1999). That Edward Zigler, a

former member of the planning committee for Head Start and an early administrator of
the federal Head Start office, advocates such linkages is noteworthy.
187. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 18. See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION, supra note 161, at ix-x.
188.

SUZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN,

AMERICA'S CHILD CARE

PROBLEM: THE WAY OUT 2 (2002).

189.
190.
191.
192.
START,

Id. at 4; see also GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 25.
See Johnson, supra note 161, at 9.
See HELBURN & BERGMANN, supra note 188, at 55-85.
See A. Frederick North, Jr., Health Services in Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD
supra note 7, at 231; Donald J. Cohen, Albert J. Solnit, & Paul Wohlford, Mental

Health Services in Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 259, for more on

Head Start's historical connection to health services. See Robert W. O'Brien, David B.
Connell, & James Griffin, Head Start's Efforts to Improve Child Health, in THE HEAD
START DEBATES, supra note 37, at 161-78; Jane Knitzer, The Challenge of Mental Health
in Head Start: Making the Vision Real, in THE HEAD START DEBATES, supra note 37, at

179-92, for more on Head Start's contemporary connection to health services.
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shifts either to the states or to the ED. 19 3 While no one could look at the
system of health care in the United States and be satisfied with its equity,
availability, or cost, it is nonetheless true that the field of health care for
poor children has changed dramatically since Head Start began.
Created in 1965, the same year as Head Start, Medicaid is the major
program that pays for health care for poor children. 194 Medicaid is
jointly funded by the federal government and the states. 195 The primary
Medicaid program that reaches poor children is the Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) service, a program with
which Head Start has long partnered. 196 Through EPSDT, covered
children receive such benefits as physical exams, immunizations,
laboratory tests, health education, and vision, dental, and hearing
97
services. 1198
States set the exact parameters of eligibility for this
program.
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a more
recent program, was created in 1997 to cover children in low-income
families whose income exceeds the Medicaid cutoff but who still cannot
buy private health insurance on their own. 99 Another federal-state
partnership, SCHIP is designed the way one version of the Head Start
block grant proposal might work; there are certain federal minimum
requirements that individual state plans must meet, but states have a wide
variety of ways of designing their plans. 200 Nothing about these
programs requires linkage with Head Start as it is currently structured.
While budget cuts at the state level are a source of strong concern to
many advocates,
budgets at the federal level are not immune to cuts.
NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73.
See ELICIA J. HERZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID: A PRIMER CRS-2 to 5
(2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33202_20051222.pdf.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2) (2006).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2006); see also PROJECT HEAD START, supra note
7, at 149.
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2006).
198. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2006).
199. See Lisa Dubay, Genevieve Kenney, & Jennifer Haley, Children's Participation
in Medicaid and SCHIP: Early in the SCHIP Era, NEW FEDERALISM NATIONAL SURVEY
OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, Series B, No. B-40 (Urban Inst. Mar. 2002); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1397aa(a) (2006) (describing purpose of program).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb (2006) (describing general requirements for state child
health plans under this program).
201. See, e.g., Leighton Ku & Sashi Nimalendran, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, LOSING OUT: STATES ARE CUTTING 1.2 TO 1.6 MILLION Low-INCOME PEOPLE
193.

194.

FROM MEDICAID, SCHIP AND OTHER STATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS

(2003),

available at http://www.cbpp.org/12-22-03health.htm; Donna Cohen Ross & Laura Cox,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, OUT IN THE COLD: ENROLLMENT FREEZES IN SIX
STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS WITHHOLD COVERAGE FROM ELIGIBLE

CHILDREN (2004), available at http://www.cbpp.org/12-22-03health2.htm; Margo
Edmunds, Martha Teitelbaum, & Cassy Gleason, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, ALL OVER
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The real issue is coalition building to ensure full funding, not whether the
program is funded at the state or federal level.
It would be hard to discuss the funding structure of major social
service programs without mentioning the 1996 battles over welfare
reform, in which welfare was converted from a federal entitlement
program into a block grant to the states. 20 2 The population of families
receiving welfare overlaps with the population of families served by
Head Start,20 3 so poor families and their advocates have a vested stake in
both programs. Indeed, many of the opponents to block granting Head
Start were also opponents of the 1996 welfare reform.2 °4 The 1996
legislation imposed time limits of a maximum five years in a recipient's
~20 requirements. 206 The
lifetime,20 5 as well as2 new and heavier work
legislation also contained major budget cuts. 20 7 While any in-depth
analysis of this policy change lies far beyond the scope of this article, it
is worth emphasizing that the most controversial elements of the
reform-the imposition of time limits and the decrease in federal
funding--could have been achieved through the regular process of
reauthorization and appropriation without transforming welfare into
block grants. These changes happened to accompany the devolution of
welfare to a block grant, but they were neither necessary elements of a
block grant nor impossible to achieve through a federal program.
As a final note on changes in welfare and work policies since 1965,
it is important to mention the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 20 ' First
begun in 1975 and sharply expanded in the 1990s, the EITC provides a
wage supplement directly to low-income workers to increase their
incentive to move off welfare and into work.20 9 Currently, the EITC is
one of the three largest federal programs to support poor families and is
worth $30 billion annually, 2 10 which is more than all federal money spent
THE MAP: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM

(CHIP) (2000).

202.

A vast literature on this topic exists. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 300-34 (1996); CONLAN,
supra note 34, at 272-92; PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA'S HEART: RFK AND
THE RENEWAL OF HOPE 119-43 (2001), for three different discussions ranging from the
academic to the personal.
203. See, e.g., KAHN& KAMERMAN, supra note 148, at 135.
204. See KATZ, supra note 202, at 330.
THE POORHOUSE:

205. Sheila R. Zedlewski & Jennifer Holland, How MUCH Do WELFARE RECIPIENTS
KNOW ABOUT TIME LIMITS? (Urban Inst. 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/

uploadedpdf/310904-snapshots3_nol 5.pdf.
206. KATZ, supra note 202, at 331; CONLAN, supra note 34, at 289.
207. KATZ, supra note 202, at 331; CONLAN, supra note 34, at 290.
208. See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING
POVERTY 111-14 (1997).

209.
210.

See id. at 112-13.
Leonard E. Burman & Deborah I. Kobes, Tax Facts: EITC Reaches More
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on Head Start and child care combined. 211 Recent studies demonstrate
that the EITC is the most successful of all income support programs at
reaching low-income families with children. 212 Some scholars explicitly
refer to the EITC as "a form of child care support, ''2 13 and suggest that
expanding the EITC might be a good way to get more money into the
child care system rather than directly funding child care either as a block
grant or a federal program. 1 4 The EITC thus represents another major
change in the structure of welfare and work that affects the broad policy
context in which today's Head Start finds itself.
3. The Education
Populations

System

and Traditionally

Under-Served

Advocates for Head Start object to transferring federal oversight of
the program to the ED for two primary reasons: first, the school system
has historically not met the needs of poor, minority children, and second,
the school system does not provide the type of comprehensive services,
from health care to parent involvement, that are the hallmark of Head
Start.2 15 Changes on both of these fronts require rethinking.
The realities of racial segregation in the school system (and beyond)
in 1965 when Head Start was created are stark and disturbing to recall.
Head Start's originators were understandably reluctant to root massive
amounts of federal money through states where governors vociferously
defied federal desegregation orders 216 or through public school systems
that would rather close than admit black children. 217 Yet while the
contemporary system of public education in the United States is far from
perfect, it is clear that the current system in no way parallels the reality
Eligible Families Than TANF, Food Stamps (Tax Policy Ctr., Urban Inst. & Brookings
Inst.,
Mar.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/

1000467_EITC_reaches.pdf.
211. Calculated by adding appropriations for Head Start (see Head Start Program Fact
Sheet, supra note 15) and child care programs (see Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006
Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra note 162).
212. Burman & Kobes, supra note 210.
213.

GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 47.

214.
215.

BLAU, supra note 185, at 67, 213.
See supra notes 73-79, 128-131 and accompanying text.

216. See generally UNDERSTANDING THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: AN EXERCISE IN
REMEMBRANCE AND RECONCILIATION (Elizabeth Jacoway, C. Fred Williams, eds., 1999)

(opposition of Arkansas governor to desegregation); see also RAFFEL, supra note 10, at
34 (Virginia), 158 (Alabama).
217. See, e.g., RAFFEL, supra note 10, at 158 (1998) (detailing Virginia legislative
sessions devoted to figuring out ways to stop integration, including shutting down school
systems and providing money for white children to attend private schools); ZIGLER &
MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 182 (describing refusal of Lee County, Alabama to sell an
empty public school building to a Head Start program so that the building could be sold
to a white-only private school).
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of 1965. Decades of reforms within the educational establishment have
focused, albeit with varying degrees of success, on rooting out economic
and racial inequities. From the high school completion rate 21 8 22to0
2 19 to college attendance,
enrollment in college preparatory classes
there is evidence of the improved status of minority students. To be sure,
the American school system remains plagued by inequality; recent
studies report that schools are now re-segregating (although not by
government fiat), 22 1 and minority students are overrepresented in the
country's special education population 222 and lower tracks of abilitygrouped systems. 223 Scholars, activists, and policy-makers rightly focus
on these problems of inequity. Yet the focus on what the system still
needs to achieve should not ignore the progress that has been made over
the last few decades.
Further, to say today that Head Start must remain separate from the
school system is ultimately to condemn the school system. This is
certainly not an implausible argument, but it is worth examining the full
implications of such an argument, were Head Start advocates to make it
more explicitly. Taking the argument to one ultimate conclusion would
be to say that it is actually appropriate that schools re-segregate so that
attention can be devoted to each sector of the population; in fact, the
federal government should open and fund schools for minority children,
and/or poor children, of every age level, since the state and local systems

218. See, e.g., EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PROJECT SERIES, VOLUME I: A
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 73 (Dec. 1996) (indicating
that high school completion rates for 18 to 24-year-olds increased by ten percentage
points for black students from 1973 to 1994, from 66.8% to 77.0%, while rate for white
students remained effectively constant at approximately 83.0%; however, completion rate
for Hispanics remained essentially fixed around 55% over that twenty-year period).
219. See id. at 129 (indicating that, over ten-year period in the 1980s, percentage of
blacks in sophomore year of high school enrolled in college preparatory classes increased
from 26.9% to 40.9%, roughly equivalent with white enrollment at 42%, while
enrollment of Hispanic students increased 24.6% to 35.1%; during same period,
vocational enrollment declined for blacks from 34.1% to 6.2%, for Hispanics from 29.2%
to 9.9%, and for whites from 17.6% to 6.3%).
220. See William G. Bowen, Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term
Consequences of ConsideringRace in College and University Admissions 9-10 (1998)
(noting that percentage of black students aged 25 to 29 with college degrees rose from
5.4% to 15.4% between 1960 and 1995, while percentage of Hispanics older than 25 with
a college degree rose from 4.5% in 1970 to 9.2% in 1995).
221. See generally GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ., 1999); GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN E.
EATON, & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996).
222. See, e.g., HERBERT GROSSMAN, ENDING DISCRIMINATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION

(2d. ed. 2002).
223. See, e.g., TOM LOVELESS, THE TRACKING WARS: STATE REFORM MEETS SCHOOL
POLICY 2-3, 14 (1999).
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still seem to be failing them. Alternatively, to take the argument in a
different direction, rejecting the public school system for private school
vouchers is the appropriate solution. The voucher movement is closely
connected to this idea of the failure of the public school system,
especially for poor and minority students, and vouchers are indeed
popular among many low-income and African American communities.224
It is not inconceivable that Head Start advocates intend to make either of
these arguments, but this potential interest in radical federal
reconfiguration on the one hand or entirely abandoning a failing school
system on the other remains, at most, unspoken.22 5
It is also important to note that about one-third of Head Start's
population are white children.226 Thus, the issue is the ability of the
public schools to serve not only poor minority children but poor children,
period. But in this area, too, the education system has made great strides
over the last forty years. The 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, passed the same year as Head Start, created Title I, a dedicated
funding stream targeted to serve poor children and high-poverty
schools.227 States have also increasingly directed their own funds to such
students.22 8 After the Supreme Court held that there was no federal
constitutional right to education and, therefore, no requirement to
equalize funding between poor and wealthy school districts, 229 advocates
224. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLECLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 121-22 (2001).
225. Since resegregation of public schools is an issue of concern when considering
the ability of the public school system to serve minority children, it is worth noting that
Head Start programs, located as they often are in residentially segregated communities,
are often just as racially segregated as the public schools. The historical role of
socioeconomic integration in Head Start programs is additionally interesting to consider
in light of this reality. One charge frequently levied against the school system is that
socioeconomic segregation limits its ultimate success. See generally, KAHLENBERG,
supra note 224. But Head Start has from its conception been conceived of as a purposely
socioeconomically segregated program. There were some early attempts to integrate
some percentage of paying middle class children on a sliding scale, but federal policy
shifted away from this. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 126-31. Advocates
in fact insisted that Head Start remain limited to poor children, another controversy that
helped doom the 1971 Child Development Act to failure. Id. Contrasting defacto racial
segregation and de jure economic segregation in Head Start programs with Head Start
advocates' dismay at such segregation in the public school system, it becomes apparent
that the Head Start community has an ambivalent relationship towards different types of
segregation.
226. Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
227. See, e.g., John F. Jennings, Title I Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in
TITLE I: COMPENSATORY EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1-24 (Geoffrey D. Borman,
Samuel C. Stringfield, & Robert E. Slavin, eds., 2001).
228. Kevin Carey, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE POVERTY-BASED
EDUCATION

FUNDING:

A

SURVEY

OF

CURRENT

PROGRAMS

AND

IMPROVEMENT (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/l l-7-02sfp.pdf.
229. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

OPTIONS
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2006]

BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

for school equity turned to state-level litigation, which has resulted in
completely revised funding systems in many states (although, again,
inequities remain). 230 Finally, NCLB comes (at least in rhetoric) as close
to mandating equal education in the public schools as anything ever has,
requiring, among other things, that districts provide demographic
analysis of student test scores so that averages will not hide the lower
performance of (and lack of attention paid to) traditionally under-served
groups.2 31 While hardly perfect, the school system has devoted
considerable effort and has made significant improvement in its ability to
serve poor children.
As for the argument that the school system is unable to offer the
family and comprehensive services that Head Start programs prize, this,
too, is belied by on-the-ground changes since Head Start was created.
Health and social services have become increasingly entrenched in the
public schools.232 In particular, special education programs funded
through the ED include a provision for "related services," through which
special education students are entitled to various health services that will
support their educational needs, and also include mandates for parent
involvement.2 33 In implementing the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)-whose predecessor, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, postdates Head Start by a decade234-the ED
230. See, e.g., Paul Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in
the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34-71 (Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, & Janet S.

Hansen, eds., 1999).
231. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND: A DESKTOP REFERENCE 9, 14, 18, 23 (2002), http://www.ed.gov/admins/

lead/account/nclbreference/reference.pdf.
232. See, e.g., David Tyack, Health and Social Services in Public Schools: Historical
Perspectives, 2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19 (1992), reprinted in MARK G. YUDOF,
DAVID L. KjRP, BETSY LEVIN, & RACHEL F. MORAN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW

758, 761 (Dan Alpert, Tangelique Williams & Stephanie Keough-Hedges eds.,
Wadsworth Group 4th ed. 2002) (noting sharp increase in percentage of non-instructional
support staff providing social and health services and sharp decline in percentage of
teachers when compared to all school employees in the period between 1950 and 1986).
233. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (2006) (defining related services); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006) (including parents as part of the team that crafts each child's
Individualized Education Program).
234. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITY AND
NONDISCRIMINATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF

SECTION
504
31-40
(1996),
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/
content.storage_01/0000000b/80/24/le/99.pdf., for more on the legislative history of
these acts. Note that the special education laws started as a federal program when the
states were seen as not doing enough for children with disabilities, but that this federal
block grant has leveraged great sums of state and local money to serve these children.
See Barnett & Masse, supra note 163, at 161; see also PAUL T. HILL & ELLEN L. MARKS,
FEDERAL INFLUENCE OVER STATE AND
NONDISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION (1982).
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has already demonstrated that it can go beyond a narrow classroom focus
to the human services that support those classrooms. Additionally, many
school reformers call for a more wide-scale integration of education and
human services, and point to many successful models around the
country.235 Title I has also increasingly required schools to involve
parents in their children's education.2 36 While Head Start advocates are
correct that Head Start mandates and provides family and comprehensive
services in a way that every individual school and school system does
not, it is an exaggeration to say that such provision is either impossible or
could not be done well.
Even assuming that Head Start serves poor and minority children
and provides comprehensive services better and more thoroughly than
the school system currently does, there remains the argument that under
the helm of the ED, Head Start could serve as a model in all of these
areas. In the heat of opposition to proposals for structural change, Head
Start advocates have long dismissed this idea, finding laughable the idea
that tiny Head Start could provoke broader programmatic change, as
opposed to being swallowed and co-opted by the larger department.23 7
At other times, however, distant from such controversies, some
advocates and early Head Start leaders have expressed the point of view
that Head Start has served as a role model or instigated change in the
school system by its very presence. For example, Julius Richmond, the
first director of Head Start, has asserted that Head Start's low teacherpupil ratio created pressure on elementary schools in low-income
neighborhoods to adopt similarly low ratios. 238 Edward Zigler has stated
that Head Start's inclusion of children with disabilities in its program
influenced the special education legislation that followed a decade later,
especially in its mandate of comprehensive services for children age
three to five.239 If federal legislation shifting Head Start into the ED
retained a focus on comprehensive services, or required that school
systems in general provide those services, such requirements are likely to
be met. The real issue is how the specific legislation governing Head
235. See, e.g., J. Levy & W. Shepardson, A Look at Current School-linked Service
Efforts, in 2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 44 (Spring 1992), reprinted in EDUCATIONAL
POLICY, supra note 232; FINN-STEVENSON & ZIGLER, supra note 186; Donna Cohen Ross
& Meg Booth, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Health Coverage Programs: Schools
are Part of the Equation (2001), available at http://www.centeronbudget.org/10-1Olhealth2.pdf.
236. See Jerome V. D'Agostino, Larry V. Hedges, Kenneth K. Wong, & Geoffrey D.
Borman, Title I Parent Involvement Programs: Effects on Parenting Practices and
Student Achievement, in TITLE I: COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, supra note 227, at 117-36.
237. See HEAD START INTHE 1980's, supra note 121; NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra
note 73.
238. PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 124.
239. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 164.
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Start would be crafted, not which federal agency has oversight authority.
One relative-and, in this context, ironic-constant in the
educational system since Head Start's creation has been a strong
connection between Head Start and local school systems. In the first
summer, eighty percent of agencies that sponsored Head Start programs
were schools, and in the 1990s, despite the rhetoric of mistrust, nearly a
third were.24 ° Zigler writes that "collaborative efforts between Head
Start and the schools are on the rise," noting that, "[w]ith more minorities
in leadership positions in the schools, Head Start may have less to fear
from school sponsorship today than it did a decade ago."2 4' While Zigler
concludes that Head Start is better able to collaborate effectively with
school systems only if it remains outside the educational
establishment, 242 it is simply no longer clear that this is the best way
forward, given the changes in the education system since 1965.
B. DoctrinalDevelopments
It is not only the policy context that has changed since Head Start
was created; the doctrinal context in which federal civil rights legislation
is created has changed dramatically as well. In the 1960s, Congress
played an expansive role in passing civil rights legislation, both by
developing spending programs designed to promote equity and
equality 243 and by requiring anti-discriminatory behavior.244
This
expansive role of Congress was supported by the Supreme Court, which
consistently upheld challenges to civil rights legislation.24 5 More
broadly, the Supreme Court continually affirmed the importance of the
federal judiciary in civil rights by approving longstanding federal court
control over desegregation cases, 246 rooting the rights of the poor and
minorities in the federal constitution, 247 and expanding the role of the
240. Id. at 174.
241. Id. at 189.
242. Id. at 190.
243. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 19001994 26-98 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
244. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d) et
seq. & tit. VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) etseq.
245. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (both upholding the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
246. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (stating that
"the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has
been completely removed").
247. See, e.g., Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (striking down
state welfare law that imposed one-year waiting period before new resident could receive
welfare benefits on the grounds that it violated the right to travel implicit in the Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment); Gideon v.
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Supreme Court to specify these rights in detail that came close to
legislating.245 The executive branch of the federal government was also
powerful in its involvement with civil rights. For example, President
Kennedy and President Johnson issued important Executive Orders that
mandated either anti-discrimination or affirmative action, which
remained undisturbed by the federal judiciary.24 9

At the time of Head Start's inception, then, the primary place for a
proactive governmental response to civil rights lay in the federal

government. While Head Start is an anti-poverty program rather than
anti-discrimination legislation, Head Start was created as part of the civil
rights movement of the 1960s.

Thus, it is important to see that its

structure was designed within the standard framework of a now-defunct
era. For over the last decade, the Supreme Court has restricted
Congress's constitutional authority to enact civil rights legislation under

two of its main sources of power-Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 250 and the Commerce Clause2 5 '-a move that has resulted in
turning over power to the states at almost every turn. 252 These
restrictions collectively frame the atmospherics in which any discussion
of the allocation of federal or state power takes place.

As a practical matter, neither of these restrictions directly affects
Head Start's existence, stemming as the program does from Congress's
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
that counsel must be provided for a criminal defendant who is too poor to hire his own
lawyer); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause forbids "separate but equal"
educational facilities for black and white students); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498500 (1954) (holding that Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates Equal
Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the protection against
racial discrimination by the federal government).
248. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (crafting specific
requirements for police interrogation of criminal suspects, rooted in the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination).
249. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (mandating antidiscriminatory hiring in federal agencies and establishing "affirmative action"
requirements for federal contractors); Exec. Order No. 11, 063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963)
(requiring federal agencies to prevent discrimination in federally supported housing).
250. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article," including the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
535-37 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as invalid Section 5
legislation and limiting scope of Section 5 authority).
251. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes .. " U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-12 (2000) (striking down the
Violence Against Women Act as invalid Commerce Clause legislation and limiting scope
of Commerce Clause authority).
252.
See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER:
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002).
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spending power,253 the contours of which have not changed greatly since
Head Start's creation. Congress may use its spending power only to
support "the general welfare," but courts should defer to Congress's
interpretation of this goal; any conditions Congress imposes on
acceptance of the funding should be imposed unambiguously and must
be generally related to the federal interest.254 Additionally, "other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds., 255 In other words, the conditions
must be substantively as well as procedurally constitutional. Finally, the
conditions imposed must not, in comparison to the amount of money
offered, become coercive.25 6 It is unlikely that Head Start's existence,
whether funded as a federal program or a block grant to the states, would
face a serious challenge under any of these prongs. But even though
Head Start as a spending program is not directly threatened by retreats in
Commerce Clause and Section 5 doctrine, it is clear that the heady time
of broad congressional power to enact federal civil rights legislation is
gone.
What may affect Head Start and its compatriots in spending
programs is a parallel line of Supreme Court cases expanding states'
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. While Head Start
advocates do not explicitly mention this fear in the debates over block
granting Head Start, there may be cause for concern that transferring
Head Start to the states would result in no way to enforce the program's
terms, given this immunity.
Here, ironically, there may be an
opportunity to use this line of otherwise troublesome cases to benefit
Head Start participants.
Eleventh Amendment doctrine provides that suits may not be
brought against unconsenting states.25 7 The Ex Parte Young doctrine has
created a legal fiction that allows state officers to be sued as a way of
getting at state action, 25 8 but this legal fiction allows only suits for
prospective-i.e. injunctive-relief 2 5 9 No Ex Parte Young suit for
retrospective or compensatory relief is available.26 ° In the last few
decades, Congress passed legislation rooted in either the Commerce
253. "The Congress shall have Power To... provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
254. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
255. Id. at 208.
256. Id. at 211.
257. Literally, the Eleventh Amendment provides a state immunity only from suit by
a citizen of another state, but this immunity has been extended even against suits by an
individual state's own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890).
258. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
259. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-76 (1974).
260. Id.
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Clause or the Civil War Amendments 26' attempting to abrogate this
immunity.262 Congressional abrogation of state immunity would allow
suits directly against the states and permit suits for damages as well as
injunctive relief. In 1996, however, the Supreme Court rejected
congressional attempts to use its Commerce Clause (and other Article I)
powers to abrogate state immunity,2 63 a conclusion that has been given
more force in ensuing cases.264
However, congressionally forced abrogation is not the only path to
permitting suits against the states. As the current doctrine stands, while
Congress may unilaterally abrogate state immunity only under the Civil
War Amendments, states may choose to waive their immunity by
consenting to suit. 265 This waiver must be explicit and unambiguously
clear; no constructive waiver or implied consent is acceptable.2 66 While
there is some thought that this element of the doctrine may be in flux,
given the Court's cutbacks in other types of congressional power,
Congress may currently require a state to waive its immunity as a
condition attached to its spending power.2 67 If Congress were to recast
Head Start as a block grant with an explicit requirement that a state
accepting these funds would waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit, program beneficiaries might benefit from an increased ability
to enforce the program's terms as well as an ability to receive damages if
the program is not fully implemented.
261. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments collectively constitute
the Civil War Amendments.
262. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999) (noting recent vintage of
congressional attempts to abrogate sovereign immunity).
263. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999). Congress may, however, abrogate state
immunity under the Civil War Amendments, which the Supreme Court held altered the
federal-state relation from the allocation of power in the original core of the constitution.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1976).
264. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that Congress
cannot abrogate state immunity from suit in state court any more than it could in federal
court under Article I powers); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535
U.S. 743, 768-69 (2002) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity from suit
under Article I powers in federal administrative agencies). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll.
v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (holding that Bankruptcy Clause of Article I
precludes states from asserting sovereign immunity defense).
265. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
669 (1999).
266. Id. at 680 (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184
(1964)).
267. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141, 167-215 (2002)
(characterizing breadth of spending power as "paradoxical" in light of the Court's other
cutbacks of congressional power in favor of the states, but arguing that this breadth is
appropriate in the structure of federalism that the Court has been fashioning).
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The IDEA provides one model of what such a restructuring could
look like. First, the IDEA contains a sovereign immunity provision,
stating explicitly that states "shall not be immune under the 1 1th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal
court for a violation of this title. 268 Second, the IDEA frames its
requirements as an individual entitlement-in this case, to a free and
appropriate public education for students with disabilities-not simply a
set of activities that states must perform.269 Indeed, the right to a free and
appropriate public education is so strong that school districts may, in
certain instances, be required to pay for a child's education at private
school when the public school is not meeting that child's needs. 270 Third,
the IDEA contains a mechanism for individual enforcement, first through
state administrative hearings, with recourse to a federal lawsuit for
review of the administrative decision.2 7' It might be possible for Head
Start advocates to support block grant legislation that framed the
program's services as an entitlement with individual enforcement
available.2 72
Advocates have assumed that block granting Head Start would
automatically lead to a loss of accountability without considering
whether restructuring the legislation could result in an improvement in
accountability. It is true that banking on a waiver of sovereign immunity
is not without risk, as the breadth of permissible conditions attached to
268. 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (2006). While the Courts of Appeal are in general
agreement that this provision acts as a waiver, it has been noted that the provision is
actually listed in the statute as an "abrogation" and that there is no specific reference to
conditioning waiver on receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., AW. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch.,
341 F.3d 234, 244-55 (3d Cir. 2003). A similar provision in a revised Head Start statute
should take this cautionary observation seriously and "include terms ...providing that
states expressly agree to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a condition for
[receiving] funding." Id. at 250 n. 13.
269. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006). See Barnett & Masse, supra note 163, at 161, for
another articulation of the benefits of offering Head Start-like services as an entitlement.
270. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993); Sch.
Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369
(1985).
271. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(i) (2006).
272. Interestingly, litigation on the Medicaid EPSDT program-which has long been
tied to Head Start, see supra note 196 and surrounding text-has sometimes taken the
structure of individual enforcement through § 1983 suits against a state deemed to have
waived its sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852,
860-63 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Zietlow, supra note 267, at n.23 (summarizing cases
decided both for and against the plaintiff). Head Start advocates should thus be familiar
with the benefits of this type of enforcement. However, because the Supreme Court has
made it increasingly difficult to use § 1983 to enforce spending clause statutes, see, e.g.,
Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds ofa Coherent
Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1838, 1867-86 (2003), a mechanism
like that provided in the IDEA, as opposed to reliance on § 1983, would be preferable for
a revised Head Start statute intending to provide a private right of action.
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spending clause authority is uncertain, particularly with the recent
turnover on the Supreme Court.273 Yet there would still be ways to
mitigate the risk through carefully drafted legislation. For example,
notwithstanding the provision on sovereign immunity in the IDEA, the
most frequent defendants are the local school districts, avoiding the
problem of state immunity entirely.274 The same could be true in a reimagined Head Start context if the statute made the most relevant
defendants the local service providers. Regardless of the Supreme
Court's eventual treatment of a waiver of sovereign immunity as a
permissible use of spending clause authority, then, individual recipients
of Head Start services would still have some constitutionally available
defendant to sue. In any event, this proposal for individual enforcement
of a right to Head Start services is only one example of how the
seemingly restrictive current doctrine might be used to Head Start's
benefit. Advocates should seek out other ways to use the evolving
doctrine as best they can, rather than refuse to explore its possibilities
because it is not all they hoped for.
The changes in social welfare policies and doctrinal allocation of
governmental power described above indicate that it is reasonable to
examine whether Head Start's basic structure remains the best way to
organize an early intervention program for poor children so that health,
education, and welfare outcomes reach a certain level.
Yet it is
impossible to consider policy changes absent the political structure in
which they are embedded. As a political issue, however, the question
changes:
if a reconsideration of Head Start's structure would be
reasonable and potentially even beneficial to program participants but
politics keeps it from happening, how can the process move forward?
The next two sections consider how negotiation theory and practice can
not only shed light on the current dynamics but also help put in place
such a process.

273. See Baker & Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND.
L.J. 459, 461, 503 (2003) (arguing, even before Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
joined the Court, that a Congress that attempted to use the spending power to get around

the substantive limitations on its power either to regulate or enforce rights against the

states could and should lead the Supreme Court to revise the spending doctrine).
274. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Ed., Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services, Office of Special Education Programs, PartB ProceduralSafeguardsNotice, at
17-33 (describing for parents the process of filing a complaint alleging the school
district's failure to provide a free and appropriate public education to their child, and
indicating that the usual parties are the parents and the school district), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/modelform-safeguards.pdf.
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III.

Moving Forward: Opportunities and Barriers Behind an InterestBased Process

A.

What is an Interest-BasedProcess?

Distinguishing between positional bargaining and interest-based
bargaining is one of the most basic premises of contemporary negotiation
scholarship.2 75 In positional bargaining, the parties frame their goals as
outcomes,
immediately visible results that will make it clear who
"won." 276 In interest-based bargaining, by contrast, the parties dig
beneath their initial positions to discover the basic interests behind them,
to build a better relationship through better communication, and, ideally,
to come up with a solution that better meets both parties' needs and that
is therefore ultimately more sustainable.2 77
It is helpful to frame the current Head Start reauthorization debates
according to this paradigm. For example, here, the position of the Head
Start advocates is that the program must remain funded in a federal-local
stream and must remain under the supervisory authority of HHS. The
diametrically opposed position of the administration and the House
sponsors, at least originally, seems to have been that a block-grant trial
and more integration with the ED is preferable to the current structure.
It is harder from the outside of a controversy to determine what the
parties' interests are, since the answers to these questions will not always
be immediately obvious.
Now, however, for the purpose of
demonstrating the importance of discovering the interests that lie behind
the articulated positions, we can identify at least two different levels of
potential interests for each set of parties in the dispute over Head Start's
structure. At one level, the rhetoric that accompanies the parties'
position statements indicates some interests.2 78 Advocates want to make
sure that children receive comprehensive health services, and they want
parents to be involved in the program. They want to make sure that the
neediest children and families will be served. They want to make sure
that teachers are highly qualified. And they want programs all across the
country to serve kids equally well. They want these things because they
feel that children receiving them "are less likely to have to repeat grades;
end up in jail; and are more likely to complete high school, college, and
275.

See

ROGER

FISHER, WILLIAM URY

& BRUCE PATTON,

GETTING

TO YES:

NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 3-14, 40-55 (Penguin Books 1991), for

the classic statement of this framework.
276. See id. at 3-14.
277. See id. at 40-55.
278. Cf NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73 with Press Release, DHHS, supra
note 1.
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have greater earning potential than children not able to participate in the
program., 279 Because they feel that the federal government and HHS can
best meet those interests, they want control of the program to remain
where it is.
The administration and House sponsors articulate other interests.
They want a greater emphasis on school readiness in Head Start
programs to better prepare poor children for success in school. They
want preschool programs to be better coordinated with each other and
with the K-12 school system. They want these things because they feel
that poor children will demonstrate "improved performance in school" if
they experience them. 280 Because they feel that states and the federal
education department can best reach these results, they advocate
changing control of the program.
At this level, both parties identify some interests that lie behind their
positions; they just assume that there is a one-to-one overlap between
interests and positions, whereas in actuality there is no particular reason
why any one structure is the only way to meet those interests. There is
also a reasonable amount of overlap between the articulated interests of
each side. Both parties, for example, want to ensure the success of poor
children in school and later life; they just differ in how to define and
reach these goals. Because parties too often focus on their differences to
their detriment, it is important to note similarities when they appear-not
to pretend that everybody agrees but because it is often possible to reach
agreement that satisfies the shared interests while accepting the
differences as another part of the solution.281
At another level, the interests of the parties may be a step removed
from the actual substance of the debate. Perhaps the Head Start
advocates in 2003 had an interest in defeating Republicans in the 2004
elections, and so did not want to participate in an act of bipartisanship if
it would help President Bush's chances of re-election. Perhaps they are
interested in their standing in the broader advocacy community; having
protested against these particular changes for so long, they may not wish
to back down now. The administration and House sponsors too may
have been thinking about the 2004 election cycle. The President, with an
interest in being known as the education president, may wish to connect
Head Start to his signature NCLB to help this image. The President may
279.
280.
281.

NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73.
Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1.
See John Forester, Dealing with Deep Value Differences, in THE CONSENSUS

463, 479-87
(Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKeaman, & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds., 1999)
(describing conflict between citizens and organizations in the state of Colorado en route
to reaching agreement about how to spend federal money for HIV/AIDS funding).
BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT
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also want to bolster his reputation with those who believe that
government closer to the people is best, and turning over control of Head
Start to the states may help counter the impression of the federalization
of education that NCLB gives. Further, for both the advocates and the
administration, the symbolic signaling of their relative strength and
support may matter as much as the substance of the debate itself.
Whether or not these actually are real interests of the parties, it is
important to note that there is nothing in interest-based bargaining that
need be politically naive. This is not an issue of effective hardball tactics
versus mushy, touchy-feely ones. From business deals to policymaking,
from international treaties to agreements between individuals, interestbased bargaining can be sophisticated and successful. Paying attention
to the parties' interests at all levels, from the most public-minded to the
most self-serving, allows discussion of a broader variety of options that
may better meet those interests than an either-or strategy will. Interestbased bargaining offers the opportunity to pay attention to the substance
behind the rhetoric.
B.

Why is an Interest-BasedProcessImportant Here?

This article argues that the reauthorization debate over Head Start's
structure, while rooted in the interests of 1965, has lost this original
framework of interest-based bargaining and shifted to a less helpful
positional bargaining stance. Because the policy and legal context has
changed over the last forty years such that the expressed positions are no
longer the only way to achieve the underlying interests, there is value to
be created by thinking about ways to restructure the program. A more
useful strategy would focus on the parties' actual interests, which may be
better served by exploring a multiplicity of options with possibilities for
joint gain.
But even if advocates do not accept the argument that there is value
to be created in changing the program's structure, there is still a strong
possibility that nominal victories will actually be long-term losses.
Consider, for example, the advocates' claimed success in thwarting the
most recent round of proposed structural reforms, joining a long line of
examples in which an unyielding party reached his or her goal.
Especially in cases of perceived moral value-which, given the civil
rights context in which Head Start was created, advocates use to frame
the debate-refusal to give an inch may seem like the best way
forward.282 However, it is important to fix the cycle of antagonism
between the advocates and their perceived opponents in the
282.

See id. at 463-65 (examining the basis for this belief).
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administration and House because there are ways their perceived
opponents can have the last word even if nominally the advocates appear
successful.
For example, within a month of the Senate committee's vote to
reject the restructuring elements of the House and administration's
proposals, some House Republicans asked the General Accounting
Office (GAO) 283 to investigate fraud and mismanagement in Head Start
centers across the country.284 Commenting on this request to the GAO,
one Brookings Institution fellow said, "If you can trash the old system,
then people are more willing to try something new .... The welfare
queen played a role in welfare reform from beginning to end., 285 Indeed,
when the GAO released its report, it found an abundance of fiscal
improprieties in Head Start programs,286 a result that the House members
who requested the report treated as a scandal and an outrage.287 While
the NHSA questioned both the scope of the GAO's findings and the spin
of the House members,288 the bill that passed the House in fall 2005 was
"refocused" to address the issue of program mismanagement. 89 It is
speculation that the request for the GAO report was connected to the
advocates' opposition to restructuring Head Start, but certainly the House
sponsors seem to have had the last word on something the advocates
dislike. Further, if the GAO report lays groundwork for a programmatic
retreat, any victory for the advocates in thwarting the attempts to
restructure Head Start will have been pyrrhic indeed.
The advocates' opponents may also be able to accomplish their
objectives even without the statutory structural changes they originally
wanted. In the fall of 2003, the Bush administration, acting through
HHS, began to implement a standardized test to four- and five-year-olds
in Head Start programs, moving towards the education focus the
283. On July 7, 2004, the GAO's name changed from the General Accounting Office
to the Government Accountability Office. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004).
284.

Diana Jean Schemo, Republicans Urge Inquiry on Head Start, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

26, 2003, at A22.
285. Id.
286. See United States Gov't Accountability Office, Head Start: Comprehensive
Approach to Identifying and Addressing Risks Could Help Prevent Grantee Financial
Management Weaknesses, at 3-4 (February 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d05176.pdf, Greg Winter, Government is Criticized on Oversight of Head
Start, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 2005, at AI0.
287. See U.S. House Education & the Workforce Committee News Update,
Independent GAO Report Criticizes Financial Controls in Head Start Program; Says
Reforms are Needed to Prevent FinancialAbuses that Cheat Children, Taxpayers, and
Honest Grantees, Mar. 18, 2005, available at http://www.house.gov/ed-workforce/press/

press 109/first/03mar/headstart031805.htm.
288. See Winter, supra note 286.
289. See Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary, supra note 89.
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administration wished the program to have, to the continued outcry of the
Head Start advocates. 290 Moreover, the advocates object to the current
Senate bill because it jeopardizes Head Start's longstanding commitment
to parent participation, 29' and they say that the flat funding of the
program in fiscal year 2007 is nothing less than the "slow-motion
demise" of the program.292 Advocates would thus do better by focusing
on their interest in maintaining Head Start's character as a well-funded
comprehensive program rather than their position that Head Start must
remain outside the ED. An example from a previous iteration of the
block grant wars provides a similar caution. After advocates succeeded
in derailing the Reagan administration's exploration of block granting
Head Start in 1982, the administration was able to accomplish many of
its deregulatory objectives without formal legislation simply by
reallocating funds provided for federal oversight to the grantees
themselves.2 93 It is not opposition to the block grant per se but their
actual interests in some kind of federal oversight and programmatic
standards that advocates should voice.
In this vein, it is worth recalling Zigler's caution that, to their
detriment, child care advocates' "vision of the perfect frequently
becomes the enemy of the good., 294 It was the insistence on a federallocal delivery that led to the downfall of the 1971 Comprehensive Child
Development Act.295 Twenty years later, when the next federal child
care bill finally became law, it was funded much more minimally,
designed much less comprehensively, and structured as a block grant to
the states, matching much less closely the expressed interests of the
advocates in the debates over the 1971 legislation.29 6 Here, too, the
advocates' vision of a perfect Head Start, fought for legislatively and
temporarily won, may backfire. What if governors and state education
associations start to lobby for the funding that now goes to Head Start?
What if the rise in state-level organizing for prekindergarten programs
290.

See NHSA, Issue Brief: Head Start National Reporting System, available at

http://www.nhsa.org/download/advocacy/fact/HSNRS.pdf.
291.

See NHSA, Keep Head Start Alive and Well: Key Messages on Senate Head

Start
Bill
(Dec.
2005),
available
at
http://www.nhsa.org/download/
advocacy/Senate_.Bill.pdf.
292. Press Release, NHSA, "Slow-Motion Demise" of Head Start Seen if Congress
Fails to Add $234 Million to Undo Destructive 2006 Budget Cuts (Apr. 11, 2006),
available at http://www.nhsa.org/press/NewsArchived/indexnews_041106.htm;
see
also Press Release, NHSA, Head Start "Downward Spiral" Seen in Growing Number of
Program Closures and Painful Cutbacks in Service (June 22, 2006), available at
http://www.nhsa.org/ press/NewsArchived/indexnews_062206.htm.
293. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 198.
294. Id. at 135.
295. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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weakens Head Start's independence? 297 There is an opportunity now to
rethink alliances and build relationships to expand Head Start-like
services for more children, and advocates should not miss the
opportunity by fighting old wars. Viewing any reauthorization that
rejects the block grant plan and the move to the ED as a complete victory
for Head Start advocates is therefore dangerously shortsighted.
C. Barriersto an Interest-BasedProcess
If an interest-based process really would be better, whether for
value creation or problem avoidance, what is preventing interest-based
bargaining from taking place in the Head Start reauthorization context?
Scholarship on conflict resolution helps identify how a common set of
barriers prevents parties from reaching a negotiated agreement that
would be better for both sides.
Strategic barriers. All negotiations contain a tension between
creating value and distributing it. 298 When it comes to creating value,
parties obtain a benefit from openly sharing their interests and
preferences. The standard example to demonstrate this point is the battle
over the orange, where two people each insist on taking as large a share
299
of one orange as possible without discussing why either one wants it.
They finally agree to cut the orange in half. One person throws away the
peel and eats the inside of the orange, while the other throws away the
inside and uses the peel to flavor a cake. If each had shared his interest
in the orange rather than arguing over who would get more, each could
have gotten more of what he actually wanted.
When it comes to distributing value, however, sharing information
with the other side becomes trickier. If you know what I want, you can
exploit this knowledge to get a better deal for yourself, as another
common example illustrates.3 °0 If I have ten apples but prefer oranges,
297. See, e.g., Nat'l Sch. Bds. Ass'n, Head Start Reauthorization(Mar. 2006) at 2-3,
available at http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/35100/35037.pdf (urging Congress to
strengthen connection between Head Start programs and schools and to allow schools to
have a role in the design and evaluation of Head Start programs); Joan E. Schmidt, NSBA
President:A novel idea: aligningfederal education laws, SCHOOL BOARD NEWS, Aug. 2,
2005 ("[i]magin[ing] the potential for improved student achievement if state and local
jurisdictions had the ability to create meaningful links between Head Start and K-12
programs" and arguing that "the lack of coherence across federal laws and programs
undermines state and local reform efforts").
298. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, Scor R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11-43 (The Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2000); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An
Exploration of Barriersto the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235,
239-42 (1993).
299. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 275, at 56-57.
300. See, e.g., Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail,supra note 298, at 240-41.
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and you have ten oranges and like both apples and oranges equally, we
each would be at least as happy by trading fruit on a one-for-one basis.
But if you know that I prefer oranges, you may try to trade one orange
for two, or three, or ten apples. My disclosure therefore gives you
power. This tension between openly sharing information to improve the
deal and keeping information back to improve one's own bargaining
power is often referred to as the negotiator's dilemma. 30 1 Behavior that
may be rational to get a bigger piece of the pie for one's self may be
irrational for the best overall outcome.30 2
The negotiator's dilemma helps explain why Head Start advocates
have been unwilling to enter into an interest-based process with
congressional decision makers.
Taking a hard line against both
proposals for structural change permits a uniform, coordinated response.
It is much easier to get Senator Kennedy to say "I oppose any effort to

block grant Head Start-not in 50 states, not even in one state ' 30 3 than it
is to get lobbyists and activists all around the country to articulate a
nuanced response about what framework would need to be in place to
make state control acceptable. Such a nuanced response might be
exploited by block grant proponents to make gaining those controls less
possible; if advocates concede that a block grant might be a fine baseline,
they might lose bargaining power to implement anything beyond the
baseline. The nuanced message might be quoted out of context.
Especially if the nuanced message is not delivered in exactly the same
way by all the advocates, block grant proponents might feel that the
opposition was not unified. Entering into an open discussion about how
a block grant or the ED move might be structured in a way that would
satisfy the advocates' interests, then, might actually put those interests in
jeopardy.
The myth of the fixed pie. The myth of the fixed pie suggests that
people tend to see the same pot of money or the same narrow set of
issues as the only thing on the table; the only point of the negotiation, in
this view, is to divide it. 30 4 This view ignores the possibility that one
party may want only the inside of the orange while another may want
only the outside, assuming instead that any deal that makes one party
more satisfied must automatically lead to the other's dissatisfaction.
Here, the Head Start advocates seem to think that the issue of structural
control is a win-lose, zero-sum proposition. If proponents of block
301.

See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 30

(The Free Press 1986); Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail,supra note 298, at 240.
302. Mnookin, Why NegotiationsFail,supra note 298, at 241.
303. Swindell & Schuler, supra note 81, at 1895.
304.

MAX BAZERMAN, JONATHAN BARON, & KATHERINE SHONK, You CAN'T ENLARGE

THE PIE: Six BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 44-65 (2001).
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granting want state control, then advocates who have always pushed for
federal control must automatically lose. This barrier prevents creative
thinking about how to structure the program so that everyone wins.
Principal/Agent tension. The principal is the intended beneficiary
of a given negotiation; the agent is the negotiator working on behalf of
the principal.3 °5 Principals use agents in negotiations because they
provide a lot of benefits: they may have more knowledge, more
resources, or greater skills. 30 6 They may also provide strategic
advantages, such as being able to bargain harder than the principals
themselves would.30 7 Here, the major Head Start advocacy groups acting
as agents certainly provide these advantages to the principals they
represent, whether those principals are the local Head Start service
providers or the children and family recipients of this service.
However, the disadvantage to using an agent is that the interests of
the agent may not be perfectly aligned with those of the principal.30 8
Here, the advocacy organizations may have a broader ideological
commitment to the fight against state control than Head Start participants
do, based on a long history of fighting devolution. The advocacy
organizations as repeat players may feel that they cannot retreat from
their staked-out positions, while the program participants, as one-time
players, may feel less bound. Even within the advocacy organizations,
younger advocates without the personal history of conflict may be more
willing to explore alternatives but may feel that the professional norm on
which their future success depends demands that they oppose the
restructuring proposals without compromise. Some Head Start service
providers might feel that being more closely connected to the schools
would be preferable, as salaries for teachers in the public school system
can be twice as much as salaries in Head Start programs. 309 Meanwhile,
some parents might feel that their state might end up doing more for
them than the current program does, even if other states might not do
such a good job. Further, because parents must deal with twelve years of
their children's education, parents might wish for a closer connection
between Head Start and schools or have more at stake in using Head
Start as leverage to transform the education system. Parents might even
rather receive the $7000 that the government will spend on Head Start

305.

MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 69-91; Mnookin, Why

Negotiations Fail,supra note 298, at 242-43.
306.

MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 71.

307. Id. at 71.
308. Id. at 75-76.
309. See Eloise Pasachoff, Head Start Works Because We Do: Head Start Programs,
Community Action Agencies, and the Struggle over Unionization,38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 247, 253-54 (2003).
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for their child as either a direct cash grant or a voucher.3 1 ° It is easy to
see how the interests of Head Start advocates and the interests of
program beneficiaries may not always coincide.
Cognitive barriers. Cognitive barriers are related to standard
patterns that underlie decision making. 31 1 For example, research in
cognitive psychology suggests that most people are generally risk averse;
they would rather take a sure thing than gamble on an unknown, even
where the unknown is potentially more beneficial to them. 312 This
research further suggests that people are even more loss averse than they
are risk averse and are thus more likely to gamble to avoid a sure loss
than to obtain a potential gain.313 Here, advocates feel that the structural
changes proposed for Head Start represent a sure loss and are unwilling
to gamble on the possibility of any benefit. This response is closely
connected to what other research terms "status quo bias,' 314 or
"endowment effects, 31 5 where parties tend to prefer something because
they already have it, regardless of whether they would prefer it to
something else if they did not have it already. On a blank slate, it might
make sense to bring state government or the educational establishment
more into the mix of providing for poor children, but to do so in the
context of a long history of advocates' opposition to these ideas make
these changes unappealing. The history itself thus acts as a barrier here,
with each set of conflicts leading in a path-dependent way to the next.
Reactive devaluation. Parties judge proposals not only on their
abstract merits but also by the context of the offer and their relationship
with the offeror.3 16 Parties are likely to judge a policy proposal as being
less favorable when they do not trust its source. Regardless of any
potential merit in the block grant/ED proposals, Head Start advocates
approached them with doubt and distrust because of a broader discomfort
with this president and his allies-among them, Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld, whom the Head Start advocacy community has long
seen as unfavorable to Head Start.3 17 It is not that these proposals would
310. See John Hood, Caveat Emptor: The Head Start Scam, in

THE HEAD START

supra note 37, at 508-09 (arguing that Head Start spending per child should be
converted into grants, vouchers, or tax relief for parents to use at the care provider of
their choice); Blau, supra note 185, at 67, 213 (2001) (discussing value of wage subsidies
over direct support of child care).
311. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail,supra note 298, at 243-46.
312. Id. at 243-44; MNOOKIN ETAL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 161-64.
313. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 244; MNOOKIN ET AL.,
BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 161-64.
314. BAZERMAN, BARON, & SHONK, supra note 304, at 7-8.
315. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 164-65.
316. Id. at 165-66; Mnookin, Why NegotiationsFail,supra note 298, at 246-47.
317. See supra notes 137-138; cf ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 164-65
(quoting Zigler's analysis of a similar set of doubts with respect to the Nixon
DEBATES,
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have been welcomed if offered by a Democratic administration, but
certainly this element of mistrust frames the debate, along with the
connection between previous attempts at block granting the program and
cutting it and broader civil rights resistance to states' rights and state
control of anti-poverty programs.
Identity and emotional barriers.3 18 Psychological realities that
make individual negotiations or personal conversations difficult are no
less applicable to a public policy dispute such as the Head Start
reauthorization, where taking a stand on an issue means identifying with
a certain set of priorities that define an identity. Here, there would be a
lot at stake in the advocates' identity if they now went along with the
block grant or ED proposal after decades of fighting both. Are they
being duped now? 319 Were they being irrational before? They might
perceive that it would be very difficult for them to explain their change
of heart to the millions of Head Start families and providers who have
followed their lead through many administrations. Staying with their
hard line position gives them no need to save face and allows them to
remain easily allied with their advocate colleagues, who take a similarly
hard line.
Strong emotion plays into this conflict, as well. 320 Head Start
advocates fervently believe in the power of the program. They tell
personal success stories behind Head Start to bring faces to the numbers.
When they hear that politicians want to change the program, they hear
that they are not currently being successful and they feel anger and
resentment. They rely on using emotional attachment to the program to
build their powerful grass-roots campaigns that bring phone calls, letters,
and personal visits to members of Congress supporting Head Start.
These emotions have contributed to the success of their lobbying
campaigns for decades but may limit their inclination to analyze policy
proposals dispassionately.
Slippery slope barriers. Negotiation on a small issue that might in
the abstract be acceptable is often rejected because of the fear that its
existence is but a slippery slope to disaster.321 Such a barrier is in play
here. The President's proposal to make state control available to all fifty
states was limited in the first House bill to a trial program with eight
administration's offerings).
318.

See generally DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON, & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT

CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO Discuss WHAT MATTERS MOST 111-16 (1999).
319. Cf ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 82 (noting Zigler's fears that the

Nixon administration had "duped" him, as one of Head Start's founders, into coming to
Washington to run the program by way of dismantling it).
320. See STONE ET AL., supra note 318, at 85-90.
321. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1029 (2003).

2006]

BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

states, but advocates rejected even that small-scale attempt on the
grounds that it was merely a prelude to block granting and therefore
destroying the program. Advocates have no incentive to make the
specifics of a proposed trial program less objectionable because a
reasonable trial might lead inexorably to an unreasonable dismantling.
The long-term, large-scale view makes a short-term, small-scale proposal
untenable.
Structural barriers. Structural barriers consider the way the
negotiation process is constructed, including attention to institutional
factors.3 22 At a basic level, the structure of the legislative process itself
may act as a barrier to interest-based policy development. For example,
the relevant players-among them Head Start advocates, broader
children/family/anti-poverty/civil rights organizations, service providers,
education representatives, parents, governors, federal and state
legislators-are dispersed and not all coordinated. They have different
amounts of power to instigate the agenda.32 3 Some parties care
passionately about Head Start reauthorization as their only issue; others
care about child welfare more broadly; others see Head Start as fitting
into a broader set of anti-poverty policies; others are responsible for
winning support from constituents and colleagues on matters relating to
international trade, homeland security, and tax reform. It is not only that
interests may diverge but also that the amount of intensity that the
relevant parties feel about this issue varies. There is therefore no natural
impetus to change the way the game works. Further, organizations such
as the NHSA, whose only mission is Head Start, may be reluctant to
change a familiar process through which they have experienced some
success.
This multitude of barriers gives a sense of the difficulties involved
in moving beyond the impasse. It should not, however, lead to the
conclusion that moving beyond the impasse is impossible. Identifying
and analyzing these barriers, as well as paying attention to the deeply
rooted history of the conflict, lay the foundation for a way forward. The
next section builds on this foundation to offer one potential framework
for an interest-based process.

322. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, LEE Ross, KENNETH J. ARROW, BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 6-7, 19-23 (1995).
323. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 197-99
(2d ed. 1995).
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Before articulating the steps for an interest-based process in the
Head Start dispute, it is important to acknowledge respectfully the
advocates' concerns about engaging in a conversation about the
program's structure.
Advocates understandably feel that such a
conversation has the potential to harm vulnerable groups, and the
suggestions that follow-indeed, the analysis that precedes-is not
intended to belittle these concerns. Rather, these suggestions attempt to
provide safeguards for these concerns while developing a process that
moves beyond the current stalemate.
The process that I propose is based on a form of dispute resolution
called consensus building. Consensus building seeks to involve all of the
relevant parties in making decisions to better address the parties'
interests and to reach agreements that have broad-based support and are
thus more sustainable. In consensus building, different stakeholder
groups come together to develop and reach agreement on an ongoing
plan in which all will participate.324 Differences are not ignored; the
process just assumes that differences on some, even many, issues need
not stymie agreement on others. Unlike traditional committee-based or
legislative decision making, where the outcome is often developed by
one party or set of parties and then delivered to another, and where
agreement is generally reached by majority-rules voting, consensusbuilding processes focus on developing outcomes collectively and
reaching agreement by consensus.
Consensus building avoids the
adversarial process associated with traditional legislating and lobbying,
which often misses opportunities to create value because the parties are
locked into an either-or battle, and which does little to improve the
parties' working relationships.
It is especially useful in highly
politicized situations where changing the dynamic of the parties'
relationship is a key part of the way forward.
There is a growing movement in public policy-making towards
using consensus-building processes as a way of resolving large-scale
multi-stakeholder disputes. A variety of nonprofit organizations provide
resources to governments that want to engage in such processes,
324. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, SARAH MCKEARNAN, & JENNIFER THOMASLARMER, THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999). The process I outline in the next
section is based especially on chapters 1 (Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building
Techniques and Strategies) and 2 (Conducting A Conflict Assessment). See KINGDON,
supra note 323, at 159-61, for more on the importance of consensus building in policy
decisions.
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including the Consensus Building Institute, based in Massachusetts,
which focuses on environmental issues; 325 the Keystone Center, based in
Colorado, whose projects feature environmental issues as well as energy
policy;

326

the National Policy Consensus Center and its affiliate, the

Policy Consensus Initiative, which work mostly on the issues of health
care, sustainability, transportation, and watersheds; 327 and the Consensus
Council, Inc., based in North Dakota, which works on issues ranging
from economic development to the environment to human services.328
Some states have commissioned their own official consensus
organizations; the Montana Consensus Council, 329 started in 1994 by
executive order of the governor, is the most prominent, and eight other
states also have executive orders promoting forms of alternative dispute
resolution, including consensus building, as important mechanisms for
problem solving. 330 Inspired by the success of these state-level and nonprofit organizations, in 200i a bipartisan task force framed an outline for
the U.S. Consensus Council, which Congress would commission to
address issues that Congress and the White House feel would benefit
from such a process, especially deadlocked, contentious issues. 331 In the
summer of 2003, the Senate Governmental Affairs committee
unanimously approved a bill supporting the Council, and the Council
took a step closer to implementation.3 32 The variety and success of the
projects facilitated by these organizations should provide encouragement
for those who may initially be suspicious about the prospects of such a
process.333

325. See The Consensus Bldg. Inst., Introduction, http://www.cbuilding.org/
consensus/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
326. See The Keystone Ctr., About Us, http://keystone.org/generalsection/index.html
(last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
327. See Policy Consensus Initiative, http://www.policyconsensus.org/ (last visited
Aug. 20, 2006).
328. See The Consensus Council, Inc., http://www.agree.org/ (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).
329. See The Montana Consensus Council, About Us-History and Original
Executive Order, http://mcc.state.mt.us/about/ExecutiveOrder.asp (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).
Orders,
Initiative,
Executive
Consensus
Policy
330. See
http://www.policyconsensus.org/tools/executiveorders/index.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2006).
331. See The United States Consensus Council, http://www.usconsensuscouncil.org/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
332. Id.; United States Consensus Council Act of 2003, S. 908, 108th Cong. (2003).
333. In addition to the project descriptions on the websites listed, see supra notes 325332, the Consensus Building Handbook contains dozens of case studies where consensus
building processes were successfully used to resolve public policy problems. See THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 85-1086.
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B. A Frameworkfor Consensus Building in the Head Start Dispute
1.

Starting the Process

Consensus-building processes are generally initiated either by
people in leadership positions with a stake in the dispute or by neutral
parties who are interested in the resolution of the dispute.334 What is
most important is that the process is initiated in a way that avoids
reactive devaluation, where one party will refuse to participate because
the instigator of the process seems biased.335 In the contentious Head
Start context, it might be best if a neutral party proposed the process. An
independent think tank or a center at an academic institution would be an
appropriate convenor, reaching out to ask stakeholders to participate in
such a process, or contracting with a professional consensus-building
organization to do the same. Alternatively, interested parties in the form
of either government players or advocacy groups could initiate the
process. If the idea for consensus building were to come from Congress,
it could be written into the Head Start legislation, commissioning a report
to Congress within a year or so, in time for the next reauthorization. The
process might also be initiated by advocates or practitioners who
recognize that opportunities for positive change are being missed. Two
neutral parties could also initiate the process together, demonstrating
stronger institutional support for the process from the start. Any of these
possibilities for instigating the process could work. The challenge with
all will be to maintain both appearance and reality of interest in a new
way of communicating and decision making.
2.

Performing a Conflict Assessment

After the process is initiated, the convening group should hire a
neutral party to conduct a conflict assessment, reaching out individually
to the stakeholders to identify issues of importance; ensure that everyone
with a stake is involved; establish that it makes sense to proceed with the
process; and determine what specific details will make the process best
meet the parties' needs.3 36 Conducting a conflict assessment is important
for a number of reasons. Without a conflict assessment, important
stakeholders might be left out and issues might be missed or framed in a

334. See Susan Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and
Strategies,in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 63.
335. See supra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
336. Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict
Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 99, 100.
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way that would prove unhelpful.3 37 The conflict assessment avoids the
pitfall of trying this new way of interacting but doing it wrong, making
relationships more acrimonious.33 8 It also helps the parties build trust
339
with the neutral, which can then lead to respect for the process.
Finally, the neutral can translate the parties' initial ideas about the
process into impartial language, which can avoid an unnecessary battle
over framing the issues from the start. 340 The conflict assessment plays
an important role in making sure first that the process should go forward
and then that it does go forward in the most helpful way possible.
While the conflict assessment will produce a more specific list of
necessary stakeholders, it is worth emphasizing that the pool of
stakeholders should be conceptualized broadly. Given the fragmented
way the system of early care and education in this country has developed
over the last forty years, and given the potential for more connections
among the parties, it is important that, at this moment of
reconceptualizing service delivery, the process be very inclusive. A first
cut at the relevant stakeholders from within the Head Start community
might include the NHSA, the Head Start Bureau, state collaboration
offices, executive directors of Head Start programs, teachers and staff in
Head Start programs, Head Start parents, and former Head Start children.
Perhaps an early leader of Head Start, such as Edward Zigler, could be
involved. Additional stakeholders might include representatives from
governors' offices, state departments of education, members of the child
advocacy and child care communities, early education teachers and
researchers, Community Action Program leaders, children's health
workers, welfare activists, and human resource directors at a variety of
employers, as well as some staff to members of Congress.
Designing the process to involve so many stakeholders attempts to
respond to several barriers articulated above. First, involving more
people may reduce the principal-agent tension, 34 1 as a greater variety of
voices may lead to less presentation of the party line and a more honest
exploration of potential decisions. Second, the process may also respond
Collaboration with child welfare
to identity/emotion barriers.3 42
advocates is already a central part of the Head Start advocates' identity,
and this process allows them to expand their collaborative work and
allows trust to develop within working groups such that controversial
proposals may be discussed collectively. Finally, the inclusion of so
337.
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many stakeholders also attempts to respond to reactive devaluation. 343 If
the broader advocacy world is involved, there is less of a chance that the
Head Start community will feel threatened and refuse to participate, and
vice versa.
Note that some reluctance on the part of the stakeholders to
participate in the process need not doom it. 344 Stakeholders with little

experience with consensus building and with a long history of
antagonism may feel skeptical about the potential the process holds.
Participating in the initial stakeholder interviews can be one way to
overcome some of the reluctance; initial participation can also
demonstrate to a skeptical party that some success may be reached. Of
course, if many major players consistently refuse to participate, the
process may not go forward. On the other hand, if the process goes
forward anyway, reluctant stakeholders may decide to participate, since
their views will not be represented if they do not.
The conflict assessment should result in a report to the convenors
and the interviewees describing and analyzing the findings of the
assessment and making recommendations about how the consensusbuilding process should proceed.
3.

Structuring the Process

Because structuring the process that the consensus building will
follow is something that should be done with the parties, this section
only outlines generally what such a process might look like and explains
how elements of the process could respond to the barriers to interestbased agreement articulated above.
Defining the Problem.3 45
Instead of a limited, contentious
question-such as "Should Head Start be turned over to the states and
the Department of Education?"-a broad, open-ended question should
frame the process. For example, the participants could be charged with
rethinking the current system of early education, care, and health and
social services for young children and their families, developing ways
that government can facilitate the provision of these services, with a
special focus on at-risk children and families but also attending to the
needs of children from working- and middle-class families. Framing the
problem as broad instead of narrow attempts to respond to the barrier of
status quo bias or endowment effects; 346 while Head Start advocates may
initially be unwilling to agree to any change to their own singled-out
343.
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program, they generally agree that the current system is inadequate. A
larger question would allow the process to start from the premise that
some agreement is possible.
Articulating Goals and a Potential Outcome. 347 A goal for the
outcome of the process is not a substantive result, but an end product of
the group's work. A report to Congress presenting the group's findings
and recommendations would be one sensible option. So would reports to
each state, available to the public at large. These reports, collaboratively
agreed upon, would respond to the negotiator's dilemma, the tension
between the benefits to and the drawbacks of openly sharing
information.3 48 Since the reports would be consensus documents,
nothing can be released that does not have all of the participants'
blessing. It will be easier for advocates to share information in small
pieces and develop trust in a coordinated working group than to
demonstrate anything less than a hard line in uncoordinated lobbying
sessions.
Identifying and Including Participants.349 Because the number of
potential participants is likely too high for there to be open participation,
representative participation makes sense, but all potential stakeholders
should feel that their voices and interests are being represented in the
consensus group. The consensus group should also plan how the
representatives will communicate with their constituents.350
For
example, the consensus group could create additional advisory boards,35 1
or hold a series of sessions from state to state with open invitations to
everyone with an interest and a stake in the matter.
Logistical Choices and Ground Rules.352 The group will need to
decide, among other things, when the group(s) will meet, over what time
period, how often, where, how conversation will proceed both at and in
between meetings, and what roles will be assigned to group members.
At this theoretical stage, it is impossible to provide many details on what
specific decisions should be made. It is worth mentioning, however, that
it would be best if the process does not take place entirely in a hotel
conference room in Washington, D.C. Instead, the sessions should take
place around the country and should ideally involve site visits to
programs and agencies.353
Defining a General Approach to Building Consensus. Practitioners
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 77.
See supra notes 301-304 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 91-93.
See id. at 88-89.
See id. at 86-87.
See id. at 79-81, 96-97.
See id. at 86, 97.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:2

distinguish among several types of consensus-building processes: (1) "a
conventional problem-solving approach," where participants frame the
problem and come up with solutions; (2) an approach that involves
working with a single-text document, where the parties collectively
revise a working draft of an agreement document; and (3) "a visioning
approach," where parties move through the questions "What do we
have?" "What do we want?" and "How do we get there? ' 354 The nature
of the task at hand-a broad reconceptualizing of the current system of
early care and education-suggests that a visioning approach would be
most useful. The visioning approach can be thought of as akin to the
committee that originated Head Start in 1965, creating something out of
nothing by thinking big. The approach also usefully helps participants
focus on interests, since behind the question "What do we want?" should
always lie a series of questions that ask "Why?" Thinking about the
future also gets people away from being trapped in the positions of the
present, responding to the myth of the fixed pie.355
Educating the Parties.356 This phase of the process puts on the
agenda time for parties to listen to each other in the knowledge that each
party will have its turn. The first challenge is to focus on interests rather
than positions. For Head Start advocates, this will mean focusing not on
why state control of Head Start would be bad or why Head Start must not
move to the ED but instead on what interests Head Start's current
structure speaks to and why those interests are important in any future
system. It will also mean listening to other stakeholders' interests and
trying to find ways in which those interests either overlap or differ in
ways that could be usefully linked.357 This phase attempts to respond to
the negotiator's dilemma,358 since sharing interests and information as
part of an ongoing conversation in a working group is comparatively
low-risk. This phase also responds to loss/risk aversion, status quo bias,
and endowment effects, 359 because nothing is given up at the outset, and
there is no foreordained conclusion that the current structure will be
found lacking.
Developing Options.360 Depending on how the consensus group is
structured, it may be more useful for sub-groups or smaller task forces to
generate options around different sets of proposals, or it may be more
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useful for the group at large to develop these options. This could also be
a time to use a single-text document for the parties to revise
collaboratively. For example, parties could construct state-level plans
for more involvement in Head Start by integrating programs across the
state, inserting safeguards and requirements that Head Start advocates
would find acceptable. This phase helps overcome the structural barrier
of the legislative process because stakeholders need not ultimately
support an option they work on generating, 36 1 while in contrast,
stakeholders with limited input into the legislative process may feel
reluctant to engage with disfavored options for fear that they will be seen
to agree with them. Option generating also responds to the negotiator's
dilemma because its framing as a collaborative discussion rather than a
presentation of a position to a final decision maker allows for true
brainstorming without sacrificing anything.3 62
Reaching and Implementing Agreements.3 63 Consensus building
may use a wide variety of ways of reaching agreement. Participants may
make decisions according to an agreed-upon set of criteria; they may
reach agreement one issue at a time or develop a series of packages; they
may establish priorities and trade among them. After deciding on the
method, stakeholders may reach any of a number of actual agreements,
from more state coordination with no federal changes to massive federal
changes with specific protections in place to ensure that stakeholders'
interests are met (for example, that programs continue to have high levels
of parent involvement and comprehensive services, to take an issue of
importance to Head Start advocates). Developing this series of systems
might lead to meeting the interests of the current proponents of major
structural reform without actually doing any major federal restructuring,
or it might allow major federal restructuring to take place in a way that
will be palatable to Head Start advocates. It is impossible to say from
the outset; developing the system options is part of the process of
reaching agreement.
4.

Overcoming Potential Problems

There are no guarantees that this process will work. The parties
could refuse to come together or refuse to engage in the process fully.
The stakeholders' internal constituencies could feel betrayed and
pressure the stakeholders to stick firmly with positions or to drop out of
the process. The slippery slope and structural barriers are especially hard
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to get around,36 4 since engaging in a process like this reveals some
willingness to change that could be exploited, and since the legislative
process-which must eventually be involved if statutory changes are
envisioned-allows issues to be traded and coalitions to shift. It is
important not to underestimate the potential problems involved with
setting up a consensus-building process.
On the other hand, it is also important not to assume that these
problems are insurmountable. For example, regardless of whether the
process stems from a think tank, academic institution, advocates, or
Congress itself, politicians who are proponents of changing Head Start's
basic structure may feel able to support this process. A process designed
in part to consider changing the structure of government involvement in
early education and care might allow proponents of block granting to feel
that they have made at least some progress toward their goal. Legislating
the existence of this process may put possible structural changes on the
table more seriously than they have ever been before. Ever mindful of
elections, politicians may support the process to have another
accomplishment to point to, especially if protest from the Head Start
advocacy community would otherwise hurt them.
It will likely be harder to gain support for this process from Head
Start advocates for a host of reasons already discussed. Crafted
correctly, however, with a broad set of participants, enough trusted Head
Start leaders supporting the process, and a mandate that the process has
no pre-ordained conclusion, this process may win support. If it seems
like the process stems from Congress as a replacement for mandating a
restructured Head Start, advocates may feel that they are on safer ground.
Advocates may also realize that successfully derailing proposals for
structural reform may not result in a long-term victory, given the number
of ways that the effects of structural change can be achieved by going
around the normal legislative process. Further, advocates need give
nothing up in order to participate in the process; there are no
commitments involved in brainstorming; and the idea of consensus-based
decision making should alleviate fears of being outvoted, since everyone
must agree to the final outcome.
Indeed, notwithstanding potential concerns about opening up
discussions regarding structural reform, the recent history of Head Start
suggests that Head Start advocates might be willing to participate in such
a process. In 1993, the Secretary of HHS formed a diverse and
bipartisan Advisory Committee on Head Start Quality and Expansion,
bringing together forty-seven individuals from the Head Start
community, various government offices, the private sector, and the field
364.

See supra notes 321-323 and accompanying text.

2006]

BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

of children's health and education, tasked with creating a vision for a
21st Century Head Start. 365 While not framed as a consensus-building
process, the Advisory Committee reached unanimous agreement on a
report (that called for, among other things, increased partnerships among
all levels of government and across a variety of programs) 366 whose
conclusions were subsequently reflected in the 1994 Head Start
reauthorization.3 67 Now, a dozen years later, on the other side of welfare
reform and the creation of the Child Care and Development Fund, and in
the wake of the first presidential and congressional proposals for
structural reform since the Reagan administration, advocates may agree
that the time is right for another group to convene. In the current
climate, much more heated than in 1993, a consensus-building process
holds value.
Notwithstanding this logic, advocates may still refuse to participate
in a consensus process on the theory that discussing the options behind
structural change is one foot in the door to mandating them. Eugene
Volokh calls this the "slippery slope inefficiency," where socially
optimal outcome A is bypassed because of pressure from advocacy
groups who fear that it may lead to undesired outcome B.368 Prof.
Volokh suggests that one way around the inefficiency is for each side
(assuming there are characterizable sides) to both win and lose
something (assuming there are identifiable victories and losses).369 In
this way, outcome A is not easily reducible to a victory or loss for either
side, requiring legislators to understand the nuances of outcome A rather
than reducing it to a bullet-point that makes one side seem politically
stronger; the slippage from outcome A to outcome B thus becomes more
difficult. 37 0 There might be a way, he says, for opposing interest groups
that have continuing relationships with legislators and with each other to
find a way to craft mutually satisfactory agreements that avoid these
inefficiencies that the voting public could otherwise not. 371 A consensusbuilding process would seem to provide such an opportunity. Prof.
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(last accessed Aug. 26, 2006);
Biographical Sketches of Committee Members, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
hsb/research/2 l century/bio-sketches.htm (last accessed Aug. 26, 2006).
366. See Forging New Partnerships,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/
researchI2 1_century/partnerships.htm (last accessed Aug. 26, 2006).
367. See Testimony of Olivia Golden Before the Committee on Education and the
Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.house.gov/
edworkforce/hearings/109th/fc/headstartO4O5O5/golden.htm (last accessed Aug. 27,
2006).
368. See Volokh, supra note 321, at 1126.
369. Id. at 1126-27.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1131-32.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:2

Volokh also suggests that advocacy groups who might reasonably
respond to outcome A with an ad hominem attack against its supporters
(who also want outcome B) might find their public perception tarnished
by this "too partisan or even ill-mannered" attack.372 According to this
theory, advocates' refusal to participate in a consensus-building process
that clearly has no mandate to come out a certain way and that is open to
broad participation from the Head Start community may be harder to
spin as a dangerous step on the slippery slope. Additionally, as to the
specifics of any plan the process might create, advocates will be in a
better position to ensure that any small-scale trial of structural change
has enough safeguards that it will not proceed inexorably to change the
entire structure nationwide.
Structural barriers with the legislative process still remain. For
example, even if Congress agrees to follow the results of the consensus
process, it cannot bind future Congresses to that effect. Nothing
guarantees that the consensus agreement produced would not be selected
in bits and pieces, when only the whole document represents what the
parties feel comfortable with. On the other hand, the broad array of
stakeholder participants may lessen the chance that Congress would
eventually pass something contrary to the advocates' interests as
expressed in the consensus agreement, since more than simply the Head
Start community would likely feel betrayed if Congress bypasses the
consensus agreement. This answer is not entirely satisfying, however,
and it is clear that some risk may be involved.
My responses to these potential problems are not meant to be glib;
certainly these are real concerns. The conflict assessment should pay
special attention to them before suggesting that the process continue.
Yet despite these potential problems, the process still presents an
opportunity for long-term success.
Conclusion
"Every change that we proposed in Head Start met with great
resistance at both the federal and local level, but later people came to
adopt the idea as their own," recalls Edward Zigler, thinking about his
days running Head Start in the early 1970s. 373 He was speaking in
particular about a proposal to serve children with disabilities in Head
Start, a proposal that ultimately made it into law over the opposition of
some Head Start staff. He goes on to explain why Head Start was more
successful at serving disabled children than the public schools were: at
the time of the proposal to serve disabled children in Head Start, "the
372.
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schools ha[d] never really been forced to adopt a mainstreaming strategy.
But Head Start did not have the option to place children with special
needs in a classroom by themselves down the hall. 374
This example demonstrates not that Head Start is necessarily more
successful than the schools are at serving this target population but that
legislation matters. When legislation required Head Start programs to
serve disabled children, they did, and they did it well. Rather than
objecting to structural proposals for Head Start, then, advocates should
instead think about what their underlying interests are and how the
proposals can be crafted to meet them. The example also reminds us that
Head Start has been in flux since its creation and that aspects of the
program we now take for granted were controversial when they were
first introduced. Resistance to large-scale change is natural because it
brings the unknown, which especially in certain political climates can
feel threatening. But perceiving structural change as only dangerous is a
limited view.
The recurring debate over the funding and structure of Head Start is
framed too narrowly as an either-or proposition: dismantle Head Start as
we know it or maintain its structure and increase its funding. This focus
on value distribution misses the opportunity for value creation and keeps
the players stuck in a cycle of negative history and unproductive
relationships. Analysis of the opportunities for change, the barriers that
prevent change, and the potential for an interest-based process helpfully
changes the debate. This analysis leads to two observations. First, it
would not be impossible to change Head Start's basic structure in a way
that would help, not hurt, its target population, and Head Start advocates
should acknowledge this possibility. More importantly, moving from the
current mode of combative, positional lobbying, which may undercut the
long-term success of the program, to an interest-based consensus-and
coalition-building process may again provide better results for the target
population.
As the movement for early childhood education and care gains force
around the country, a policy window is opening for a strengthened
nationally supported system in which Head Start can play an important
role. 375 Head Start advocates should take the opportunity to imagine the
possibilities of a reshaped system, not to fear change.
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